Requiredness. An Argument for Value-Realism
What is An analysis of Requiredness? This paper presents three versions of an argument in defence of a form of value-realism. The argument is based on a principle of nonreducibility of integral wholes to sums, as informally developed by Gestalt theorists, systematically worked out by Husserl in his...
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Rosenberg & Sellier
2016
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oai:doaj.org-article:90c86a47af7640859af875b67102f3db2021-12-02T09:51:20ZRequiredness. An Argument for Value-Realism10.13128/Phe_Mi-195712280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/90c86a47af7640859af875b67102f3db2016-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7130https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 What is An analysis of Requiredness? This paper presents three versions of an argument in defence of a form of value-realism. The argument is based on a principle of nonreducibility of integral wholes to sums, as informally developed by Gestalt theorists, systematically worked out by Husserl in his III Logical Investigation on wholes and parts, and exploited by Max Scheler’s theory of material and axiological apriori. Roberta De MonticelliRosenberg & SellierarticlevaluesnormsrealismGestalt TheoryAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 5 (2016) |
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EN FR IT |
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values norms realism Gestalt Theory Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 |
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values norms realism Gestalt Theory Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Roberta De Monticelli Requiredness. An Argument for Value-Realism |
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What is An analysis of Requiredness? This paper presents three versions of an argument in defence of a form of value-realism. The argument is based on a principle of nonreducibility of integral wholes to sums, as informally developed by Gestalt theorists, systematically worked out by Husserl in his III Logical Investigation on wholes and parts, and exploited by Max Scheler’s theory of material and axiological apriori.
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format |
article |
author |
Roberta De Monticelli |
author_facet |
Roberta De Monticelli |
author_sort |
Roberta De Monticelli |
title |
Requiredness. An Argument for Value-Realism |
title_short |
Requiredness. An Argument for Value-Realism |
title_full |
Requiredness. An Argument for Value-Realism |
title_fullStr |
Requiredness. An Argument for Value-Realism |
title_full_unstemmed |
Requiredness. An Argument for Value-Realism |
title_sort |
requiredness. an argument for value-realism |
publisher |
Rosenberg & Sellier |
publishDate |
2016 |
url |
https://doaj.org/article/90c86a47af7640859af875b67102f3db |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT robertademonticelli requirednessanargumentforvaluerealism |
_version_ |
1718398017485144064 |