Inferences in the First Person
This paper deals with the experiential basis of deductive reasoning. It concentrates on the case of inferential knowledge in the first person. It first describes the specific kind of entitlement involved in such knowledge. A comparison is then made with inferential knowledge involving other indexic...
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Auteur principal: | Gianfranco Soldati |
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Format: | article |
Langue: | EN FR IT |
Publié: |
Rosenberg & Sellier
2017
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Sujets: | |
Accès en ligne: | https://doaj.org/article/91b5b76af938440893d881d80fc74e0e |
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