Does strengthening large shareholders’ cash flow rights reduce their expropriation motivation? Evidence from China’s dividend tax reforms
According to classic corporate governance theory, strengthening large shareholders’ cash flow rights without changing their control rights should reduce expropriation incentives by better aligning their interests with those of minority shareholders. However, due to the weaker investor protections an...
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| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | EN |
| Publicado: |
Elsevier
2021
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/92e6e5cbc5e34f06b6b4465656611330 |
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