Inefficiencies in Residency Matching Associated with Gale–Shapley Algorithms

Objective This study aimed to investigate emerging trends and increasing costs in the National Residency Matching Program (NRMP) and San Francisco Residency and Fellowship Match Services (SF Match) associated with the current applicant/program Gale–Shapley-type matching algorithms. Design...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Yue Wu, Parisa Taravati, Ryan T. Yanagihara, Courtney E. Francis, Marian Blazes, Cecilia S. Lee, Aaron Y. Lee, Russell N. Van Gelder
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Thieme Medical Publishers, Inc. 2021
Materias:	resident matching stable marriage gale–shapley nash equilibrium Ophthalmology RE1-994
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/92f032eabe27427c93a2ab4e4b5a3a08
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

id	oai:doaj.org-article:92f032eabe27427c93a2ab4e4b5a3a08
record_format	dspace
spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:92f032eabe27427c93a2ab4e4b5a3a082021-11-23T00:12:03ZInefficiencies in Residency Matching Associated with Gale–Shapley Algorithms2475-475710.1055/s-0041-1735951https://doaj.org/article/92f032eabe27427c93a2ab4e4b5a3a082021-07-01T00:00:00Zhttp://www.thieme-connect.de/DOI/DOI?10.1055/s-0041-1735951https://doaj.org/toc/2475-4757Objective This study aimed to investigate emerging trends and increasing costs in the National Residency Matching Program (NRMP) and San Francisco Residency and Fellowship Match Services (SF Match) associated with the current applicant/program Gale–Shapley-type matching algorithms. Design A longitudinal observational study of behavioral trends in national residency matching systems with modeling of match results with alternative parameters. Patients and Methods We analyzed publicly available data from the SF Match and NRMP websites from 1985 to 2020 for trends in the total number of applicants and available positions, as well the average number of applications and interviews per applicant for multiple specialties. To understand these trends and the algorithms' effect on the residency programs and applicants, we analyzed anonymized rank list and match data for ophthalmology from the SF Match between 2011 and 2019. Match results using current match parameters, as well as under conditions in which applicant and/or program rank lists were truncated with finalized rank lists, were analyzed. Results Both the number of applications and length of programs' rank lists have increased steadily throughout residency programs, particularly those with competitive specialties. Capping student rank lists at seven programs, or less than 80% of the average 8.9 programs currently ranked, results in a 0.71% decrease in the total number of positions filled. Similarly, capping program rank lists at seven applicants per spot, or less than 60% of the average 11.5 applicants ranked per spot, results in a 5% decrease in the total number of positions filled. Conclusion While the number of ophthalmology positions in the United States has increased only modestly, the number of applications under consideration has increased substantially over the past two decades. The current study suggests that both programs and applicants rank more choices than are required for a nearly complete and stable match, creating excess cost and work for both applicants and programs. “Stable-marriage” type algorithms induce applicants and programs to rank as many counterparties as possible to maximize individual chances of optimizing the match.Yue WuParisa TaravatiRyan T. YanagiharaCourtney E. FrancisMarian BlazesCecilia S. LeeAaron Y. LeeRussell N. Van GelderThieme Medical Publishers, Inc.articleresident matchingstable marriagegale–shapleynash equilibriumOphthalmologyRE1-994ENJournal of Academic Ophthalmology, Vol 13, Iss 02, Pp e175-e182 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	resident matching stable marriage gale–shapley nash equilibrium Ophthalmology RE1-994
spellingShingle	resident matching stable marriage gale–shapley nash equilibrium Ophthalmology RE1-994 Yue Wu Parisa Taravati Ryan T. Yanagihara Courtney E. Francis Marian Blazes Cecilia S. Lee Aaron Y. Lee Russell N. Van Gelder Inefficiencies in Residency Matching Associated with Gale–Shapley Algorithms
description	Objective This study aimed to investigate emerging trends and increasing costs in the National Residency Matching Program (NRMP) and San Francisco Residency and Fellowship Match Services (SF Match) associated with the current applicant/program Gale–Shapley-type matching algorithms. Design A longitudinal observational study of behavioral trends in national residency matching systems with modeling of match results with alternative parameters. Patients and Methods We analyzed publicly available data from the SF Match and NRMP websites from 1985 to 2020 for trends in the total number of applicants and available positions, as well the average number of applications and interviews per applicant for multiple specialties. To understand these trends and the algorithms' effect on the residency programs and applicants, we analyzed anonymized rank list and match data for ophthalmology from the SF Match between 2011 and 2019. Match results using current match parameters, as well as under conditions in which applicant and/or program rank lists were truncated with finalized rank lists, were analyzed. Results Both the number of applications and length of programs' rank lists have increased steadily throughout residency programs, particularly those with competitive specialties. Capping student rank lists at seven programs, or less than 80% of the average 8.9 programs currently ranked, results in a 0.71% decrease in the total number of positions filled. Similarly, capping program rank lists at seven applicants per spot, or less than 60% of the average 11.5 applicants ranked per spot, results in a 5% decrease in the total number of positions filled. Conclusion While the number of ophthalmology positions in the United States has increased only modestly, the number of applications under consideration has increased substantially over the past two decades. The current study suggests that both programs and applicants rank more choices than are required for a nearly complete and stable match, creating excess cost and work for both applicants and programs. “Stable-marriage” type algorithms induce applicants and programs to rank as many counterparties as possible to maximize individual chances of optimizing the match.
format	article
author	Yue Wu Parisa Taravati Ryan T. Yanagihara Courtney E. Francis Marian Blazes Cecilia S. Lee Aaron Y. Lee Russell N. Van Gelder
author_facet	Yue Wu Parisa Taravati Ryan T. Yanagihara Courtney E. Francis Marian Blazes Cecilia S. Lee Aaron Y. Lee Russell N. Van Gelder
author_sort	Yue Wu
title	Inefficiencies in Residency Matching Associated with Gale–Shapley Algorithms
title_short	Inefficiencies in Residency Matching Associated with Gale–Shapley Algorithms
title_full	Inefficiencies in Residency Matching Associated with Gale–Shapley Algorithms
title_fullStr	Inefficiencies in Residency Matching Associated with Gale–Shapley Algorithms
title_full_unstemmed	Inefficiencies in Residency Matching Associated with Gale–Shapley Algorithms
title_sort	inefficiencies in residency matching associated with gale–shapley algorithms
publisher	Thieme Medical Publishers, Inc.
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/92f032eabe27427c93a2ab4e4b5a3a08
work_keys_str_mv	AT yuewu inefficienciesinresidencymatchingassociatedwithgaleshapleyalgorithms AT parisataravati inefficienciesinresidencymatchingassociatedwithgaleshapleyalgorithms AT ryantyanagihara inefficienciesinresidencymatchingassociatedwithgaleshapleyalgorithms AT courtneyefrancis inefficienciesinresidencymatchingassociatedwithgaleshapleyalgorithms AT marianblazes inefficienciesinresidencymatchingassociatedwithgaleshapleyalgorithms AT ceciliaslee inefficienciesinresidencymatchingassociatedwithgaleshapleyalgorithms AT aaronylee inefficienciesinresidencymatchingassociatedwithgaleshapleyalgorithms AT russellnvangelder inefficienciesinresidencymatchingassociatedwithgaleshapleyalgorithms
_version_	1718417388920111104

Inefficiencies in Residency Matching Associated with Gale–Shapley Algorithms

Ejemplares similares