Land-leasing behavior, local officials’ promotions, and Chinese cities’ debt risks

This study first analyzes how local governments’ land-leasing behaviors affect Chinese cities’ debt risk then examines the impact of officials’ promotion mechanisms on debt risk in China’s urban land bank system. The land-leasing behavior is reflected through three indicators, namely, land-leasing r...

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Autores principales:	Lihua Zhang, Rui Han, Juanfeng Zhang, Lele Li, Danxia Zhang
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Vilnius Gediminas Technical University 2021
Materias:	land leasing urban investment bonds debt risk officials’ promotion china Management. Industrial management HD28-70 Finance HG1-9999
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/9855235fe40b403897c8573d811eeb00
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id	oai:doaj.org-article:9855235fe40b403897c8573d811eeb00
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:9855235fe40b403897c8573d811eeb002021-11-23T13:51:26ZLand-leasing behavior, local officials’ promotions, and Chinese cities’ debt risks1648-715X1648-917910.3846/ijspm.2021.15654https://doaj.org/article/9855235fe40b403897c8573d811eeb002021-10-01T00:00:00Zhttps://journals.vgtu.lt/index.php/IJSPM/article/view/15654https://doaj.org/toc/1648-715Xhttps://doaj.org/toc/1648-9179This study first analyzes how local governments’ land-leasing behaviors affect Chinese cities’ debt risk then examines the impact of officials’ promotion mechanisms on debt risk in China’s urban land bank system. The land-leasing behavior is reflected through three indicators, namely, land-leasing revenue, land-leasing scale, and land financial dependence level. Two new indicators are constructed to measure the local government’ debt risk from the perspective of debt scale and debt repayment: the debt scale risk and debt burden risk. Empirical analyses are based on the data of 281 prefecture-level cities from 2006–2015. The main findings are twofold. First, the debt scale risk is positively affected by the land-leasing revenue, and officials’ promotion pressure. The debt burden risk is positively affected by the land financial dependence and officials’ promotion pressure. Second, the officials’ promotion pressure significantly enhances the positive effect of land-leasing revenue on the debt scale risk. Local officials, who are under promotion pressure, are inclined to expand the size of urban investment bonds, which increases debt scale risk.Lihua ZhangRui HanJuanfeng ZhangLele LiDanxia ZhangVilnius Gediminas Technical Universityarticleland leasingurban investment bondsdebt riskofficials’ promotionchinaManagement. Industrial managementHD28-70FinanceHG1-9999ENInternational Journal of Strategic Property Management, Vol 25, Iss 6, Pp 485–496-485–496 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	land leasing urban investment bonds debt risk officials’ promotion china Management. Industrial management HD28-70 Finance HG1-9999
spellingShingle	land leasing urban investment bonds debt risk officials’ promotion china Management. Industrial management HD28-70 Finance HG1-9999 Lihua Zhang Rui Han Juanfeng Zhang Lele Li Danxia Zhang Land-leasing behavior, local officials’ promotions, and Chinese cities’ debt risks
description	This study first analyzes how local governments’ land-leasing behaviors affect Chinese cities’ debt risk then examines the impact of officials’ promotion mechanisms on debt risk in China’s urban land bank system. The land-leasing behavior is reflected through three indicators, namely, land-leasing revenue, land-leasing scale, and land financial dependence level. Two new indicators are constructed to measure the local government’ debt risk from the perspective of debt scale and debt repayment: the debt scale risk and debt burden risk. Empirical analyses are based on the data of 281 prefecture-level cities from 2006–2015. The main findings are twofold. First, the debt scale risk is positively affected by the land-leasing revenue, and officials’ promotion pressure. The debt burden risk is positively affected by the land financial dependence and officials’ promotion pressure. Second, the officials’ promotion pressure significantly enhances the positive effect of land-leasing revenue on the debt scale risk. Local officials, who are under promotion pressure, are inclined to expand the size of urban investment bonds, which increases debt scale risk.
format	article
author	Lihua Zhang Rui Han Juanfeng Zhang Lele Li Danxia Zhang
author_facet	Lihua Zhang Rui Han Juanfeng Zhang Lele Li Danxia Zhang
author_sort	Lihua Zhang
title	Land-leasing behavior, local officials’ promotions, and Chinese cities’ debt risks
title_short	Land-leasing behavior, local officials’ promotions, and Chinese cities’ debt risks
title_full	Land-leasing behavior, local officials’ promotions, and Chinese cities’ debt risks
title_fullStr	Land-leasing behavior, local officials’ promotions, and Chinese cities’ debt risks
title_full_unstemmed	Land-leasing behavior, local officials’ promotions, and Chinese cities’ debt risks
title_sort	land-leasing behavior, local officials’ promotions, and chinese cities’ debt risks
publisher	Vilnius Gediminas Technical University
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/9855235fe40b403897c8573d811eeb00
work_keys_str_mv	AT lihuazhang landleasingbehaviorlocalofficialspromotionsandchinesecitiesdebtrisks AT ruihan landleasingbehaviorlocalofficialspromotionsandchinesecitiesdebtrisks AT juanfengzhang landleasingbehaviorlocalofficialspromotionsandchinesecitiesdebtrisks AT leleli landleasingbehaviorlocalofficialspromotionsandchinesecitiesdebtrisks AT danxiazhang landleasingbehaviorlocalofficialspromotionsandchinesecitiesdebtrisks
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Land-leasing behavior, local officials’ promotions, and Chinese cities’ debt risks

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