Strategically positioning cooperators can facilitate the contagion of cooperation

Abstract The spreading of cooperation in structured population is a challenging problem which can be observed at different scales of social and biological organization. Generally, the problem is studied by evaluating the chances that few initial invading cooperators, randomly appearing in a network,...

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Autores principales:	Guoli Yang, Matteo Cavaliere, Cheng Zhu, Matjaž Perc
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2021
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/986c03fb0805458baf3ff88e23f8ed96
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:986c03fb0805458baf3ff88e23f8ed962021-12-02T15:23:08ZStrategically positioning cooperators can facilitate the contagion of cooperation10.1038/s41598-020-80770-82045-2322https://doaj.org/article/986c03fb0805458baf3ff88e23f8ed962021-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-80770-8https://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract The spreading of cooperation in structured population is a challenging problem which can be observed at different scales of social and biological organization. Generally, the problem is studied by evaluating the chances that few initial invading cooperators, randomly appearing in a network, can lead to the spreading of cooperation. In this paper we demonstrate that in many scenarios some cooperators are more influential than others and their initial positions can facilitate the spreading of cooperation. We investigate six different ways to add initial cooperators in a network of cheaters, based on different network-based measurements. Our research reveals that strategically positioning the initial cooperators in a population of cheaters allows to decrease the number of initial cooperators necessary to successfully seed cooperation. The strategic positioning of initial cooperators can also help to shorten the time necessary for the restoration of cooperation. The optimal ways in which the initial cooperators should be placed is, however, non-trivial in that it depends on the degree of competition, the underlying game, and the network structure. Overall, our results show that, in structured populations, few cooperators, well positioned in strategically chosen places, can spread cooperation faster and easier than a large number of cooperators that are placed badly.Guoli YangMatteo CavaliereCheng ZhuMatjaž PercNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 11, Iss 1, Pp 1-12 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Guoli Yang Matteo Cavaliere Cheng Zhu Matjaž Perc Strategically positioning cooperators can facilitate the contagion of cooperation
description	Abstract The spreading of cooperation in structured population is a challenging problem which can be observed at different scales of social and biological organization. Generally, the problem is studied by evaluating the chances that few initial invading cooperators, randomly appearing in a network, can lead to the spreading of cooperation. In this paper we demonstrate that in many scenarios some cooperators are more influential than others and their initial positions can facilitate the spreading of cooperation. We investigate six different ways to add initial cooperators in a network of cheaters, based on different network-based measurements. Our research reveals that strategically positioning the initial cooperators in a population of cheaters allows to decrease the number of initial cooperators necessary to successfully seed cooperation. The strategic positioning of initial cooperators can also help to shorten the time necessary for the restoration of cooperation. The optimal ways in which the initial cooperators should be placed is, however, non-trivial in that it depends on the degree of competition, the underlying game, and the network structure. Overall, our results show that, in structured populations, few cooperators, well positioned in strategically chosen places, can spread cooperation faster and easier than a large number of cooperators that are placed badly.
format	article
author	Guoli Yang Matteo Cavaliere Cheng Zhu Matjaž Perc
author_facet	Guoli Yang Matteo Cavaliere Cheng Zhu Matjaž Perc
author_sort	Guoli Yang
title	Strategically positioning cooperators can facilitate the contagion of cooperation
title_short	Strategically positioning cooperators can facilitate the contagion of cooperation
title_full	Strategically positioning cooperators can facilitate the contagion of cooperation
title_fullStr	Strategically positioning cooperators can facilitate the contagion of cooperation
title_full_unstemmed	Strategically positioning cooperators can facilitate the contagion of cooperation
title_sort	strategically positioning cooperators can facilitate the contagion of cooperation
publisher	Nature Portfolio
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/986c03fb0805458baf3ff88e23f8ed96
work_keys_str_mv	AT guoliyang strategicallypositioningcooperatorscanfacilitatethecontagionofcooperation AT matteocavaliere strategicallypositioningcooperatorscanfacilitatethecontagionofcooperation AT chengzhu strategicallypositioningcooperatorscanfacilitatethecontagionofcooperation AT matjazperc strategicallypositioningcooperatorscanfacilitatethecontagionofcooperation
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Strategically positioning cooperators can facilitate the contagion of cooperation

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