Collective chasing behavior between cooperators and defectors in the spatial prisoner's dilemma.

Cooperation is one of the essential factors for all biological organisms in major evolutionary transitions. Recent studies have investigated the effect of migration for the evolution of cooperation. However, little is known about whether and how an individuals' cooperativeness coevolves with mo...

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Autores principales: Genki Ichinose, Masaya Saito, Shinsuke Suzuki
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Publicado: Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2013
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/98c111a8c109446e85e7edf61387177b
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:98c111a8c109446e85e7edf61387177b2021-11-18T07:38:27ZCollective chasing behavior between cooperators and defectors in the spatial prisoner's dilemma.1932-620310.1371/journal.pone.0067702https://doaj.org/article/98c111a8c109446e85e7edf61387177b2013-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/pmid/23861786/?tool=EBIhttps://doaj.org/toc/1932-6203Cooperation is one of the essential factors for all biological organisms in major evolutionary transitions. Recent studies have investigated the effect of migration for the evolution of cooperation. However, little is known about whether and how an individuals' cooperativeness coevolves with mobility. One possibility is that mobility enhances cooperation by enabling cooperators to escape from defectors and form clusters; the other possibility is that mobility inhibits cooperation by helping the defectors to catch and exploit the groups of cooperators. In this study we investigate the coevolutionary dynamics by using the prisoner's dilemma game model on a lattice structure. The computer simulations demonstrate that natural selection maintains cooperation in the form of evolutionary chasing between the cooperators and defectors. First, cooperative groups grow and collectively move in the same direction. Then, mutant defectors emerge and invade the cooperative groups, after which the defectors exploit the cooperators. Then other cooperative groups emerge due to mutation and the cycle is repeated. Here, it is worth noting that, as a result of natural selection, the mobility evolves towards directional migration, but not to random or completely fixed migration. Furthermore, with directional migration, the rate of global population extinction is lower when compared with other cases without the evolution of mobility (i.e., when mobility is preset to random or fixed). These findings illustrate the coevolutionary dynamics of cooperation and mobility through the directional chasing between cooperators and defectors.Genki IchinoseMasaya SaitoShinsuke SuzukiPublic Library of Science (PLoS)articleMedicineRScienceQENPLoS ONE, Vol 8, Iss 7, p e67702 (2013)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
topic Medicine
R
Science
Q
spellingShingle Medicine
R
Science
Q
Genki Ichinose
Masaya Saito
Shinsuke Suzuki
Collective chasing behavior between cooperators and defectors in the spatial prisoner's dilemma.
description Cooperation is one of the essential factors for all biological organisms in major evolutionary transitions. Recent studies have investigated the effect of migration for the evolution of cooperation. However, little is known about whether and how an individuals' cooperativeness coevolves with mobility. One possibility is that mobility enhances cooperation by enabling cooperators to escape from defectors and form clusters; the other possibility is that mobility inhibits cooperation by helping the defectors to catch and exploit the groups of cooperators. In this study we investigate the coevolutionary dynamics by using the prisoner's dilemma game model on a lattice structure. The computer simulations demonstrate that natural selection maintains cooperation in the form of evolutionary chasing between the cooperators and defectors. First, cooperative groups grow and collectively move in the same direction. Then, mutant defectors emerge and invade the cooperative groups, after which the defectors exploit the cooperators. Then other cooperative groups emerge due to mutation and the cycle is repeated. Here, it is worth noting that, as a result of natural selection, the mobility evolves towards directional migration, but not to random or completely fixed migration. Furthermore, with directional migration, the rate of global population extinction is lower when compared with other cases without the evolution of mobility (i.e., when mobility is preset to random or fixed). These findings illustrate the coevolutionary dynamics of cooperation and mobility through the directional chasing between cooperators and defectors.
format article
author Genki Ichinose
Masaya Saito
Shinsuke Suzuki
author_facet Genki Ichinose
Masaya Saito
Shinsuke Suzuki
author_sort Genki Ichinose
title Collective chasing behavior between cooperators and defectors in the spatial prisoner's dilemma.
title_short Collective chasing behavior between cooperators and defectors in the spatial prisoner's dilemma.
title_full Collective chasing behavior between cooperators and defectors in the spatial prisoner's dilemma.
title_fullStr Collective chasing behavior between cooperators and defectors in the spatial prisoner's dilemma.
title_full_unstemmed Collective chasing behavior between cooperators and defectors in the spatial prisoner's dilemma.
title_sort collective chasing behavior between cooperators and defectors in the spatial prisoner's dilemma.
publisher Public Library of Science (PLoS)
publishDate 2013
url https://doaj.org/article/98c111a8c109446e85e7edf61387177b
work_keys_str_mv AT genkiichinose collectivechasingbehaviorbetweencooperatorsanddefectorsinthespatialprisonersdilemma
AT masayasaito collectivechasingbehaviorbetweencooperatorsanddefectorsinthespatialprisonersdilemma
AT shinsukesuzuki collectivechasingbehaviorbetweencooperatorsanddefectorsinthespatialprisonersdilemma
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