Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Studying the dynamics of learning in repeated games of cooperation is complicated by the short duration of traditional experiments. Here the authors perform a virtual prisoner's dilemma game over twenty consecutive days, finding that a minority of resilient co-operators can sustain cooperation...
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | article |
| Language: | EN |
| Published: |
Nature Portfolio
2017
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doaj.org/article/98f15815b87d4a3cb6c361086eaa022d |
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| Summary: | Studying the dynamics of learning in repeated games of cooperation is complicated by the short duration of traditional experiments. Here the authors perform a virtual prisoner's dilemma game over twenty consecutive days, finding that a minority of resilient co-operators can sustain cooperation indefinitely. |
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