Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma

Studying the dynamics of learning in repeated games of cooperation is complicated by the short duration of traditional experiments. Here the authors perform a virtual prisoner's dilemma game over twenty consecutive days, finding that a minority of resilient co-operators can sustain cooperation...

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Autores principales:	Andrew Mao, Lili Dworkin, Siddharth Suri, Duncan J. Watts
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2017
Materias:	Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/98f15815b87d4a3cb6c361086eaa022d
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:98f15815b87d4a3cb6c361086eaa022d2021-12-02T14:41:07ZResilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma10.1038/ncomms138002041-1723https://doaj.org/article/98f15815b87d4a3cb6c361086eaa022d2017-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms13800https://doaj.org/toc/2041-1723Studying the dynamics of learning in repeated games of cooperation is complicated by the short duration of traditional experiments. Here the authors perform a virtual prisoner's dilemma game over twenty consecutive days, finding that a minority of resilient co-operators can sustain cooperation indefinitely.Andrew MaoLili DworkinSiddharth SuriDuncan J. WattsNature PortfolioarticleScienceQENNature Communications, Vol 8, Iss 1, Pp 1-10 (2017)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Science Q
spellingShingle	Science Q Andrew Mao Lili Dworkin Siddharth Suri Duncan J. Watts Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
description	Studying the dynamics of learning in repeated games of cooperation is complicated by the short duration of traditional experiments. Here the authors perform a virtual prisoner's dilemma game over twenty consecutive days, finding that a minority of resilient co-operators can sustain cooperation indefinitely.
format	article
author	Andrew Mao Lili Dworkin Siddharth Suri Duncan J. Watts
author_facet	Andrew Mao Lili Dworkin Siddharth Suri Duncan J. Watts
author_sort	Andrew Mao
title	Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
title_short	Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
title_full	Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
title_fullStr	Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
title_full_unstemmed	Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
title_sort	resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma
publisher	Nature Portfolio
publishDate	2017
url	https://doaj.org/article/98f15815b87d4a3cb6c361086eaa022d
work_keys_str_mv	AT andrewmao resilientcooperatorsstabilizelongruncooperationinthefinitelyrepeatedprisonersdilemma AT lilidworkin resilientcooperatorsstabilizelongruncooperationinthefinitelyrepeatedprisonersdilemma AT siddharthsuri resilientcooperatorsstabilizelongruncooperationinthefinitelyrepeatedprisonersdilemma AT duncanjwatts resilientcooperatorsstabilizelongruncooperationinthefinitelyrepeatedprisonersdilemma
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Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma

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