Norm as an exclusionary reason for action
Legal rules are respected and observed for various reasons but Raz believes that a legal norm is an exclusionary reason for action, i.e. the reason that cannot be weighed with other reasons which have to direct our conduct. Thus, there are first-order reasons which may be balanced in reaching some p...
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| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | EN SR |
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Faculty of Law, Niš
2021
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/990c8e170ae54144ae85c4282b423f1c |
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| Sumario: | Legal rules are respected and observed for various reasons but Raz believes that a legal norm is an exclusionary reason for action, i.e. the reason that cannot be weighed with other reasons which have to direct our conduct. Thus, there are first-order reasons which may be balanced in reaching some practical decision, but there are also second-order reasons which preclude such balancing. Raz's theory starts from the fact that norms are created by authorities whose statements represent (second-order) reasons for action, regardless of their merits and moral acceptability. However, although the norm is valid regardless of its merits, Raz does not deny the importance of legitimacy and morality because he believes that law claims to legitimate moral authority. The first part of this paper is dedicated to Raz's understanding of the reasons for action, while the second part focuses on rules as reasons for action. Their uniqueness is visible even intuitively but the author particularly considers Raz's views that a rule is a content-independent and exclusive reason for action. The third part of the paper is dedicated to Raz's understanding of authority and the final assessment of the following question: is the norm a strong or an exclusionary reason for action? |
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