Norm as an exclusionary reason for action

Legal rules are respected and observed for various reasons but Raz believes that a legal norm is an exclusionary reason for action, i.e. the reason that cannot be weighed with other reasons which have to direct our conduct. Thus, there are first-order reasons which may be balanced in reaching some p...

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Autor principal:	Hadži Stević Brano
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN SR
Publicado:	Faculty of Law, Niš 2021
Materias:	practical reasoning reasons for action balancing of reasons exclusionary reasons authority legitimacy of authority Law K
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/990c8e170ae54144ae85c4282b423f1c
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:990c8e170ae54144ae85c4282b423f1c2021-12-05T21:40:11ZNorm as an exclusionary reason for action0350-85012560-311610.5937/zrpfn0-33320https://doaj.org/article/990c8e170ae54144ae85c4282b423f1c2021-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0350-8501/2021/0350-85012191243H.pdfhttps://doaj.org/toc/0350-8501https://doaj.org/toc/2560-3116Legal rules are respected and observed for various reasons but Raz believes that a legal norm is an exclusionary reason for action, i.e. the reason that cannot be weighed with other reasons which have to direct our conduct. Thus, there are first-order reasons which may be balanced in reaching some practical decision, but there are also second-order reasons which preclude such balancing. Raz's theory starts from the fact that norms are created by authorities whose statements represent (second-order) reasons for action, regardless of their merits and moral acceptability. However, although the norm is valid regardless of its merits, Raz does not deny the importance of legitimacy and morality because he believes that law claims to legitimate moral authority. The first part of this paper is dedicated to Raz's understanding of the reasons for action, while the second part focuses on rules as reasons for action. Their uniqueness is visible even intuitively but the author particularly considers Raz's views that a rule is a content-independent and exclusive reason for action. The third part of the paper is dedicated to Raz's understanding of authority and the final assessment of the following question: is the norm a strong or an exclusionary reason for action?Hadži Stević BranoFaculty of Law, Nišarticlepractical reasoningreasons for actionbalancing of reasonsexclusionary reasonsauthoritylegitimacy of authorityLawKENSRZbornik Radova Pravnog Fakulteta u Nišu, Vol 60, Iss 91, Pp 243-267 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN SR
topic	practical reasoning reasons for action balancing of reasons exclusionary reasons authority legitimacy of authority Law K
spellingShingle	practical reasoning reasons for action balancing of reasons exclusionary reasons authority legitimacy of authority Law K Hadži Stević Brano Norm as an exclusionary reason for action
description	Legal rules are respected and observed for various reasons but Raz believes that a legal norm is an exclusionary reason for action, i.e. the reason that cannot be weighed with other reasons which have to direct our conduct. Thus, there are first-order reasons which may be balanced in reaching some practical decision, but there are also second-order reasons which preclude such balancing. Raz's theory starts from the fact that norms are created by authorities whose statements represent (second-order) reasons for action, regardless of their merits and moral acceptability. However, although the norm is valid regardless of its merits, Raz does not deny the importance of legitimacy and morality because he believes that law claims to legitimate moral authority. The first part of this paper is dedicated to Raz's understanding of the reasons for action, while the second part focuses on rules as reasons for action. Their uniqueness is visible even intuitively but the author particularly considers Raz's views that a rule is a content-independent and exclusive reason for action. The third part of the paper is dedicated to Raz's understanding of authority and the final assessment of the following question: is the norm a strong or an exclusionary reason for action?
format	article
author	Hadži Stević Brano
author_facet	Hadži Stević Brano
author_sort	Hadži Stević Brano
title	Norm as an exclusionary reason for action
title_short	Norm as an exclusionary reason for action
title_full	Norm as an exclusionary reason for action
title_fullStr	Norm as an exclusionary reason for action
title_full_unstemmed	Norm as an exclusionary reason for action
title_sort	norm as an exclusionary reason for action
publisher	Faculty of Law, Niš
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/990c8e170ae54144ae85c4282b423f1c
work_keys_str_mv	AT hadzistevicbrano normasanexclusionaryreasonforaction
_version_	1718370959407185920

Norm as an exclusionary reason for action

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