Nash equilibria in multi-agent motor interactions.

Social interactions in classic cognitive games like the ultimatum game or the prisoner's dilemma typically lead to Nash equilibria when multiple competitive decision makers with perfect knowledge select optimal strategies. However, in evolutionary game theory it has been shown that Nash equilib...

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Autores principales:	Daniel A Braun, Pedro A Ortega, Daniel M Wolpert
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2009
Materias:	Biology (General) QH301-705.5
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/999b495a90044c48a2ce0293c206e078
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id	oai:doaj.org-article:999b495a90044c48a2ce0293c206e078
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:999b495a90044c48a2ce0293c206e0782021-11-25T05:42:14ZNash equilibria in multi-agent motor interactions.1553-734X1553-735810.1371/journal.pcbi.1000468https://doaj.org/article/999b495a90044c48a2ce0293c206e0782009-08-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/pmid/19680426/pdf/?tool=EBIhttps://doaj.org/toc/1553-734Xhttps://doaj.org/toc/1553-7358Social interactions in classic cognitive games like the ultimatum game or the prisoner's dilemma typically lead to Nash equilibria when multiple competitive decision makers with perfect knowledge select optimal strategies. However, in evolutionary game theory it has been shown that Nash equilibria can also arise as attractors in dynamical systems that can describe, for example, the population dynamics of microorganisms. Similar to such evolutionary dynamics, we find that Nash equilibria arise naturally in motor interactions in which players vie for control and try to minimize effort. When confronted with sensorimotor interaction tasks that correspond to the classical prisoner's dilemma and the rope-pulling game, two-player motor interactions led predominantly to Nash solutions. In contrast, when a single player took both roles, playing the sensorimotor game bimanually, cooperative solutions were found. Our methodology opens up a new avenue for the study of human motor interactions within a game theoretic framework, suggesting that the coupling of motor systems can lead to game theoretic solutions.Daniel A BraunPedro A OrtegaDaniel M WolpertPublic Library of Science (PLoS)articleBiology (General)QH301-705.5ENPLoS Computational Biology, Vol 5, Iss 8, p e1000468 (2009)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Biology (General) QH301-705.5
spellingShingle	Biology (General) QH301-705.5 Daniel A Braun Pedro A Ortega Daniel M Wolpert Nash equilibria in multi-agent motor interactions.
description	Social interactions in classic cognitive games like the ultimatum game or the prisoner's dilemma typically lead to Nash equilibria when multiple competitive decision makers with perfect knowledge select optimal strategies. However, in evolutionary game theory it has been shown that Nash equilibria can also arise as attractors in dynamical systems that can describe, for example, the population dynamics of microorganisms. Similar to such evolutionary dynamics, we find that Nash equilibria arise naturally in motor interactions in which players vie for control and try to minimize effort. When confronted with sensorimotor interaction tasks that correspond to the classical prisoner's dilemma and the rope-pulling game, two-player motor interactions led predominantly to Nash solutions. In contrast, when a single player took both roles, playing the sensorimotor game bimanually, cooperative solutions were found. Our methodology opens up a new avenue for the study of human motor interactions within a game theoretic framework, suggesting that the coupling of motor systems can lead to game theoretic solutions.
format	article
author	Daniel A Braun Pedro A Ortega Daniel M Wolpert
author_facet	Daniel A Braun Pedro A Ortega Daniel M Wolpert
author_sort	Daniel A Braun
title	Nash equilibria in multi-agent motor interactions.
title_short	Nash equilibria in multi-agent motor interactions.
title_full	Nash equilibria in multi-agent motor interactions.
title_fullStr	Nash equilibria in multi-agent motor interactions.
title_full_unstemmed	Nash equilibria in multi-agent motor interactions.
title_sort	nash equilibria in multi-agent motor interactions.
publisher	Public Library of Science (PLoS)
publishDate	2009
url	https://doaj.org/article/999b495a90044c48a2ce0293c206e078
work_keys_str_mv	AT danielabraun nashequilibriainmultiagentmotorinteractions AT pedroaortega nashequilibriainmultiagentmotorinteractions AT danielmwolpert nashequilibriainmultiagentmotorinteractions
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Nash equilibria in multi-agent motor interactions.

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