Kyasanur Forest Disease, is our surveillance system healthy to prevent a larger outbreak? A mixed-method study, Shivamogga, Karnataka, India: 2019
Background: Kyasanur Forest disease (KFD) is a tick-borne zoonosis that is endemic in Karnataka. Against the backdrop of the recent geographical expansion of KFD, indicating the inadequacy of policy and surveillance systems, the present study was performed to evaluate the KFD surveillance system in...
Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | , , , , , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | EN |
| Publicado: |
Elsevier
2021
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/99bbc61b72064aa4a192d8e4c8240d5d |
| Etiquetas: |
Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
|
| Sumario: | Background: Kyasanur Forest disease (KFD) is a tick-borne zoonosis that is endemic in Karnataka. Against the backdrop of the recent geographical expansion of KFD, indicating the inadequacy of policy and surveillance systems, the present study was performed to evaluate the KFD surveillance system in Shivamogga. Methods: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidelines for surveillance system evaluation were followed. Nine attributes of the system towards its objectives were evaluated in a mixed study in Shivamogga. Results: Two of three medical officers and four of six health staff at the institutions visited were found to be untrained in KFD surveillance. Integrated disease surveillance formats did not capture KFD data. Surveillance (tick, monkey, human) was mostly driven by the Health Department. Some of the critical findings of the evaluations were the absence of an animal and entomological surveillance line list, non-standardized reporting formats for human suspects, varying delays in the time-to-test across laboratories (2–16 days), and a lack of systematic data-sharing practices. Significant issues that emerged in the interview were deforestation with a change in ecosystem dynamics, limited diagnostic capacity, non-availability of point-of-care tests, outdated surveillance guidelines, a confusing surveillance perimeter (5 km), non-existing co-ownership among stakeholders, limited vaccine production capacity, and inadequate operational research. Conclusions: The system should consider integrating a One Health approach with defined ownership of activities among stakeholders. Revision of the guidelines is mandatory. |
|---|