The role of peer reward and punishment for public goods problems in a localized society

Abstract Cooperation in social dilemmas can be sustained if individuals are effectively rewarded or punished from peers within the group. However, as group size increases, we inevitably face localization, in which a global group is divided into several localized groups. In such societies, members ca...

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Autores principales:	Hiroki Ozono, Yoshio Kamijo, Kazumi Shimizu
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2020
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/99c06c8cc1db4339892f026c4d2ee66e
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:99c06c8cc1db4339892f026c4d2ee66e2021-12-02T14:59:15ZThe role of peer reward and punishment for public goods problems in a localized society10.1038/s41598-020-64930-42045-2322https://doaj.org/article/99c06c8cc1db4339892f026c4d2ee66e2020-05-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-64930-4https://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract Cooperation in social dilemmas can be sustained if individuals are effectively rewarded or punished from peers within the group. However, as group size increases, we inevitably face localization, in which a global group is divided into several localized groups. In such societies, members can reward and punish only neighbors within the same localized group, while cooperation for social dilemmas should be solved through global group involvement. In this situation, the global group and the local group are not always equal in terms of welfare, and situations can arise in which cooperation is beneficial for the global group but not for the local group. We predict that in such a locally inefficient situation, peer reward and punishment cannot function to sustain global cooperation. We conducted an experiment in which 16 group members played a public goods game incorporating peer reward and punishment. We manipulated the range of peer reward and punishment (only local members/all global members) and payoff structure (locally efficient/locally inefficient). We found that high cooperation was not achieved and that peer reward and punishment did not function when, and only when, the group was divided into localized groups and the payoff structure was locally inefficient.Hiroki OzonoYoshio KamijoKazumi ShimizuNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 10, Iss 1, Pp 1-8 (2020)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Hiroki Ozono Yoshio Kamijo Kazumi Shimizu The role of peer reward and punishment for public goods problems in a localized society
description	Abstract Cooperation in social dilemmas can be sustained if individuals are effectively rewarded or punished from peers within the group. However, as group size increases, we inevitably face localization, in which a global group is divided into several localized groups. In such societies, members can reward and punish only neighbors within the same localized group, while cooperation for social dilemmas should be solved through global group involvement. In this situation, the global group and the local group are not always equal in terms of welfare, and situations can arise in which cooperation is beneficial for the global group but not for the local group. We predict that in such a locally inefficient situation, peer reward and punishment cannot function to sustain global cooperation. We conducted an experiment in which 16 group members played a public goods game incorporating peer reward and punishment. We manipulated the range of peer reward and punishment (only local members/all global members) and payoff structure (locally efficient/locally inefficient). We found that high cooperation was not achieved and that peer reward and punishment did not function when, and only when, the group was divided into localized groups and the payoff structure was locally inefficient.
format	article
author	Hiroki Ozono Yoshio Kamijo Kazumi Shimizu
author_facet	Hiroki Ozono Yoshio Kamijo Kazumi Shimizu
author_sort	Hiroki Ozono
title	The role of peer reward and punishment for public goods problems in a localized society
title_short	The role of peer reward and punishment for public goods problems in a localized society
title_full	The role of peer reward and punishment for public goods problems in a localized society
title_fullStr	The role of peer reward and punishment for public goods problems in a localized society
title_full_unstemmed	The role of peer reward and punishment for public goods problems in a localized society
title_sort	role of peer reward and punishment for public goods problems in a localized society
publisher	Nature Portfolio
publishDate	2020
url	https://doaj.org/article/99c06c8cc1db4339892f026c4d2ee66e
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The role of peer reward and punishment for public goods problems in a localized society

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