Elite Influence on General Political Preferences
Economic models of democratic decision-making tend to assume that voters have preferences and politicians adjust their platforms to conform to voter preferences. However, the direction of causation (mostly) goes the other way. Political elites offer policy platforms and voters adopt the policy prefe...
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| Format: | article |
| Langue: | EN |
| Publié: |
Elsevier
2021
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| Accès en ligne: | https://doaj.org/article/9de430bca33545fc979b37ba7d0b6d29 |
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| Résumé: | Economic models of democratic decision-making tend to assume that voters have preferences and politicians adjust their platforms to conform to voter preferences. However, the direction of causation (mostly) goes the other way. Political elites offer policy platforms and voters adopt the policy preferences of their political anchors. Because the choices of individual voters do not affect aggregate political outcomes, voters tend to vote expressively, and might vote for outcomes they would not choose if the choice were theirs alone. The concept of expressive preferences is well-established. This paper takes the next step by explaining how voters form their expressive preferences. Expressive preferences tend to be anchored in a political identity associated with a candidate, party, or ideology, and people's political preferences on most issues are derived from their anchor preferences, which are defined by political elites. |
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