See clearly to act well. Possible levels of intentionality
Is it possible to speak of levels of intentionality? What does this mean? Further: it is possible to stratify this very sense of intentionality with other properties directly related to it, as, for instance, the fact that some acts are objectivant and that some others are “egological”? Starting wit...
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| Format: | article |
| Langue: | EN FR IT |
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Rosenberg & Sellier
2016
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| Accès en ligne: | https://doaj.org/article/a0f883b5b42649e39776cf79ff0f73b2 |
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| Résumé: | Is it possible to speak of levels of intentionality? What does this mean? Further: it is possible to stratify this very sense of intentionality with other properties directly related to it, as, for instance, the fact that some acts are objectivant and that some others are “egological”? Starting with these main topics, within a discussion directly related to The Phenomenological Mind and some of the main phenomenological works, it is my aim to establish whether a possible solution to the problem of the possible levels of intentionality can be found out. I also want to understand if and why some acts can be grounded on other acts, and what kinds of acts come prior to others. A way in which to understand the very relationship between cognitive and axiological acts, and to re-write some aspects of the phenomenological concept of experience.
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