Logical Semantics and Norms: A Kantian Perspective

It’s widely accepted that normativity is not subject to truth values. The underlying reasoning is that truth values can only be predicated of descriptive statements; normative statements are prescriptive, not descriptive; thus truth value predicates cannot be assigned to normative statements. Hence...

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Autor principal:	Sérgio Mascarenhas
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2017
Materias:	Kant legal norm logical semantics legal logic Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/a22b3d1001624521b64cd12f97b22c68
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id	oai:doaj.org-article:a22b3d1001624521b64cd12f97b22c68
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:a22b3d1001624521b64cd12f97b22c682021-12-02T10:23:37ZLogical Semantics and Norms: A Kantian Perspective10.13128/Phe_Mi-224372280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/a22b3d1001624521b64cd12f97b22c682017-12-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7297https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 It’s widely accepted that normativity is not subject to truth values. The underlying reasoning is that truth values can only be predicated of descriptive statements; normative statements are prescriptive, not descriptive; thus truth value predicates cannot be assigned to normative statements. Hence, deonticity lacks logical semantics. This semantic monism has been challenged over the last decades from a series of perspectives that open the way for legal logics with imperative semantics. In the present paper I will go back to Kant and review his understanding of practical judgments, presenting it as supported by a pluralistic semantics. From this perspective a norm of Law is a logical expression that includes as content a generic description of a possible behavior by a generality of juridical agents, and assigns to that content the assertion of its obligatory character, accompanied by a disincentive for non-compliance. From this perspective legal norms can be syntactically formalized and assigned appropriate semantic values in such terms that they can be incorporated into valid inferential schemes. The consequence is that we can put together legal logics that handle both the phenomenal and the deontic dimensions of legality. Sérgio MascarenhasRosenberg & SellierarticleKantlegal normlogical semanticslegal logicAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 13 (2017)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	Kant legal norm logical semantics legal logic Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	Kant legal norm logical semantics legal logic Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Sérgio Mascarenhas Logical Semantics and Norms: A Kantian Perspective
description	It’s widely accepted that normativity is not subject to truth values. The underlying reasoning is that truth values can only be predicated of descriptive statements; normative statements are prescriptive, not descriptive; thus truth value predicates cannot be assigned to normative statements. Hence, deonticity lacks logical semantics. This semantic monism has been challenged over the last decades from a series of perspectives that open the way for legal logics with imperative semantics. In the present paper I will go back to Kant and review his understanding of practical judgments, presenting it as supported by a pluralistic semantics. From this perspective a norm of Law is a logical expression that includes as content a generic description of a possible behavior by a generality of juridical agents, and assigns to that content the assertion of its obligatory character, accompanied by a disincentive for non-compliance. From this perspective legal norms can be syntactically formalized and assigned appropriate semantic values in such terms that they can be incorporated into valid inferential schemes. The consequence is that we can put together legal logics that handle both the phenomenal and the deontic dimensions of legality.
format	article
author	Sérgio Mascarenhas
author_facet	Sérgio Mascarenhas
author_sort	Sérgio Mascarenhas
title	Logical Semantics and Norms: A Kantian Perspective
title_short	Logical Semantics and Norms: A Kantian Perspective
title_full	Logical Semantics and Norms: A Kantian Perspective
title_fullStr	Logical Semantics and Norms: A Kantian Perspective
title_full_unstemmed	Logical Semantics and Norms: A Kantian Perspective
title_sort	logical semantics and norms: a kantian perspective
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2017
url	https://doaj.org/article/a22b3d1001624521b64cd12f97b22c68
work_keys_str_mv	AT sergiomascarenhas logicalsemanticsandnormsakantianperspective
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Logical Semantics and Norms: A Kantian Perspective

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