Logical Semantics and Norms: A Kantian Perspective
It’s widely accepted that normativity is not subject to truth values. The underlying reasoning is that truth values can only be predicated of descriptive statements; normative statements are prescriptive, not descriptive; thus truth value predicates cannot be assigned to normative statements. Hence...
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Autor principal: | Sérgio Mascarenhas |
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Formato: | article |
Lenguaje: | EN FR IT |
Publicado: |
Rosenberg & Sellier
2017
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/a22b3d1001624521b64cd12f97b22c68 |
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