Logical Semantics and Norms: A Kantian Perspective

It’s widely accepted that normativity is not subject to truth values. The underlying reasoning is that truth values can only be predicated of descriptive statements; normative statements are prescriptive, not descriptive; thus truth value predicates cannot be assigned to normative statements. Hence...

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Autor principal: Sérgio Mascarenhas
Formato: article
Lenguaje:EN
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Publicado: Rosenberg & Sellier 2017
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/a22b3d1001624521b64cd12f97b22c68
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