Negative Shocks and Political Parties’ Territorial Demands: The Institutional Roots of Party Competition

Why do political parties set an extreme or a more moderate position on the territorial dimension? Despite previous works have paid recent interest on the dynamics of the political competition on the territorial dimension, we know much less about the factors that lead to a centrifugal or a centripeta...

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Autores principales:	Francesc Amat, Toni Rodon
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Frontiers Media S.A. 2021
Materias:	economic shocks commitment problem political parties decentralization institutions Political science J
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/a25d31450f2c403bbcb5783bb6d05047
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id	oai:doaj.org-article:a25d31450f2c403bbcb5783bb6d05047
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:a25d31450f2c403bbcb5783bb6d050472021-12-01T10:47:10ZNegative Shocks and Political Parties’ Territorial Demands: The Institutional Roots of Party Competition2673-314510.3389/fpos.2021.701115https://doaj.org/article/a25d31450f2c403bbcb5783bb6d050472021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpos.2021.701115/fullhttps://doaj.org/toc/2673-3145Why do political parties set an extreme or a more moderate position on the territorial dimension? Despite previous works have paid recent interest on the dynamics of the political competition on the territorial dimension, we know much less about the factors that lead to a centrifugal or a centripetal party competition on the same dimension. In this article, we offer a new way of understanding it: we argue that parties’ policy position on the decentralization continuum not only depends on the level of territorial decentralization, but also on the credibility of the institutional agreement established through the country’s constitutional rigidity. If the original territorial pact does not guarantee that the majority group will have its “hands tied” so that it does not reverse the territorial agreement, political parties will have incentives to adopt more extreme positions on the territorial dimension. We test this argument with a dataset covering around 460 political parties clustered in 28 European countries from 1999 to 2019 and by exploiting the fact that the 2008 economic crisis unleashed a shock on the territorial design. Our results confirm our expectations. We show that both the federal deal and the credibility of the institutional arrangement through constitutional rigidity are necessary conditions to appease parties’ demands on the territorial dimension. Our results have important implications for our understanding of how institutions shape political competition along the territorial dimension.Francesc AmatToni RodonFrontiers Media S.A.articleeconomic shockscommitment problempolitical partiesdecentralizationinstitutionsPolitical scienceJENFrontiers in Political Science, Vol 3 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	economic shocks commitment problem political parties decentralization institutions Political science J
spellingShingle	economic shocks commitment problem political parties decentralization institutions Political science J Francesc Amat Toni Rodon Negative Shocks and Political Parties’ Territorial Demands: The Institutional Roots of Party Competition
description	Why do political parties set an extreme or a more moderate position on the territorial dimension? Despite previous works have paid recent interest on the dynamics of the political competition on the territorial dimension, we know much less about the factors that lead to a centrifugal or a centripetal party competition on the same dimension. In this article, we offer a new way of understanding it: we argue that parties’ policy position on the decentralization continuum not only depends on the level of territorial decentralization, but also on the credibility of the institutional agreement established through the country’s constitutional rigidity. If the original territorial pact does not guarantee that the majority group will have its “hands tied” so that it does not reverse the territorial agreement, political parties will have incentives to adopt more extreme positions on the territorial dimension. We test this argument with a dataset covering around 460 political parties clustered in 28 European countries from 1999 to 2019 and by exploiting the fact that the 2008 economic crisis unleashed a shock on the territorial design. Our results confirm our expectations. We show that both the federal deal and the credibility of the institutional arrangement through constitutional rigidity are necessary conditions to appease parties’ demands on the territorial dimension. Our results have important implications for our understanding of how institutions shape political competition along the territorial dimension.
format	article
author	Francesc Amat Toni Rodon
author_facet	Francesc Amat Toni Rodon
author_sort	Francesc Amat
title	Negative Shocks and Political Parties’ Territorial Demands: The Institutional Roots of Party Competition
title_short	Negative Shocks and Political Parties’ Territorial Demands: The Institutional Roots of Party Competition
title_full	Negative Shocks and Political Parties’ Territorial Demands: The Institutional Roots of Party Competition
title_fullStr	Negative Shocks and Political Parties’ Territorial Demands: The Institutional Roots of Party Competition
title_full_unstemmed	Negative Shocks and Political Parties’ Territorial Demands: The Institutional Roots of Party Competition
title_sort	negative shocks and political parties’ territorial demands: the institutional roots of party competition
publisher	Frontiers Media S.A.
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/a25d31450f2c403bbcb5783bb6d05047
work_keys_str_mv	AT francescamat negativeshocksandpoliticalpartiesterritorialdemandstheinstitutionalrootsofpartycompetition AT tonirodon negativeshocksandpoliticalpartiesterritorialdemandstheinstitutionalrootsofpartycompetition
_version_	1718405249521156096

Negative Shocks and Political Parties’ Territorial Demands: The Institutional Roots of Party Competition

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