An Equilibrium Analysis of a Secondary Mobile Data-Share Market
Internet service providers are offering shared data plans where multiple users may buy and sell their overage data in a secondary market managed by the ISP. We propose a game-theoretic approach to a software-defined network for modeling this wireless data exchange market: a fully connected, non-coop...
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | EN |
| Publicado: |
MDPI AG
2021
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/a2ec1530bb0b455fbbecf45aed801d66 |
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| Sumario: | Internet service providers are offering shared data plans where multiple users may buy and sell their overage data in a secondary market managed by the ISP. We propose a game-theoretic approach to a software-defined network for modeling this wireless data exchange market: a fully connected, non-cooperative network. We identify and define the rules for the underlying progressive second price (PSP) auction for the respective network and market structure. We allow for a single degree of statistical freedom—the reserve price—and show that the secondary data exchange market allows for greater flexibility in the acquisition decision making of mechanism design. We have designed a framework to optimize the strategy space using the elasticity of supply and demand. Wireless users are modeled as a distribution of buyers and sellers with normal incentives. Our derivation of a buyer-response strategy for wireless users based on second price market dynamics leads us to prove the existence of a balanced pricing scheme. We examine shifts in the market price function and prove that our network upholds the desired properties for optimization with respect to software-defined networks and prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the overlying non-cooperative game. |
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