An Equilibrium Analysis of a Secondary Mobile Data-Share Market

Internet service providers are offering shared data plans where multiple users may buy and sell their overage data in a secondary market managed by the ISP. We propose a game-theoretic approach to a software-defined network for modeling this wireless data exchange market: a fully connected, non-coop...

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Autores principales:	Jordan Blocher, Frederick C. Harris
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	MDPI AG 2021
Materias:	software-defined networks mobile share game theory second-price auction Information technology T58.5-58.64
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/a2ec1530bb0b455fbbecf45aed801d66
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:a2ec1530bb0b455fbbecf45aed801d662021-11-25T17:58:22ZAn Equilibrium Analysis of a Secondary Mobile Data-Share Market10.3390/info121104342078-2489https://doaj.org/article/a2ec1530bb0b455fbbecf45aed801d662021-10-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.mdpi.com/2078-2489/12/11/434https://doaj.org/toc/2078-2489Internet service providers are offering shared data plans where multiple users may buy and sell their overage data in a secondary market managed by the ISP. We propose a game-theoretic approach to a software-defined network for modeling this wireless data exchange market: a fully connected, non-cooperative network. We identify and define the rules for the underlying progressive second price (PSP) auction for the respective network and market structure. We allow for a single degree of statistical freedom—the reserve price—and show that the secondary data exchange market allows for greater flexibility in the acquisition decision making of mechanism design. We have designed a framework to optimize the strategy space using the elasticity of supply and demand. Wireless users are modeled as a distribution of buyers and sellers with normal incentives. Our derivation of a buyer-response strategy for wireless users based on second price market dynamics leads us to prove the existence of a balanced pricing scheme. We examine shifts in the market price function and prove that our network upholds the desired properties for optimization with respect to software-defined networks and prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the overlying non-cooperative game.Jordan BlocherFrederick C. HarrisMDPI AGarticlesoftware-defined networksmobile sharegame theorysecond-price auctionInformation technologyT58.5-58.64ENInformation, Vol 12, Iss 434, p 434 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	software-defined networks mobile share game theory second-price auction Information technology T58.5-58.64
spellingShingle	software-defined networks mobile share game theory second-price auction Information technology T58.5-58.64 Jordan Blocher Frederick C. Harris An Equilibrium Analysis of a Secondary Mobile Data-Share Market
description	Internet service providers are offering shared data plans where multiple users may buy and sell their overage data in a secondary market managed by the ISP. We propose a game-theoretic approach to a software-defined network for modeling this wireless data exchange market: a fully connected, non-cooperative network. We identify and define the rules for the underlying progressive second price (PSP) auction for the respective network and market structure. We allow for a single degree of statistical freedom—the reserve price—and show that the secondary data exchange market allows for greater flexibility in the acquisition decision making of mechanism design. We have designed a framework to optimize the strategy space using the elasticity of supply and demand. Wireless users are modeled as a distribution of buyers and sellers with normal incentives. Our derivation of a buyer-response strategy for wireless users based on second price market dynamics leads us to prove the existence of a balanced pricing scheme. We examine shifts in the market price function and prove that our network upholds the desired properties for optimization with respect to software-defined networks and prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the overlying non-cooperative game.
format	article
author	Jordan Blocher Frederick C. Harris
author_facet	Jordan Blocher Frederick C. Harris
author_sort	Jordan Blocher
title	An Equilibrium Analysis of a Secondary Mobile Data-Share Market
title_short	An Equilibrium Analysis of a Secondary Mobile Data-Share Market
title_full	An Equilibrium Analysis of a Secondary Mobile Data-Share Market
title_fullStr	An Equilibrium Analysis of a Secondary Mobile Data-Share Market
title_full_unstemmed	An Equilibrium Analysis of a Secondary Mobile Data-Share Market
title_sort	equilibrium analysis of a secondary mobile data-share market
publisher	MDPI AG
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/a2ec1530bb0b455fbbecf45aed801d66
work_keys_str_mv	AT jordanblocher anequilibriumanalysisofasecondarymobiledatasharemarket AT frederickcharris anequilibriumanalysisofasecondarymobiledatasharemarket AT jordanblocher equilibriumanalysisofasecondarymobiledatasharemarket AT frederickcharris equilibriumanalysisofasecondarymobiledatasharemarket
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An Equilibrium Analysis of a Secondary Mobile Data-Share Market

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