A phenomenological discussion of Antonio Damasio’s theory of emotions

Antonio Damasio’s Theory of Emotions has deeply contributed to the understanding of the cognitive significance of affective states and of the relation between embodiment and cognition. Nevertheless, in this paper I argue that his account is inadequate from a phenomenological point of view. In the f...

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Autor principal:	Anna Bortolan
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
Materias:	Damasio emotions feelings intersubjectivity intentionality Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/a376c00e7dd14900b3f8afdbb3c95c5d
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id	oai:doaj.org-article:a376c00e7dd14900b3f8afdbb3c95c5d
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:a376c00e7dd14900b3f8afdbb3c95c5d2021-12-02T10:11:07ZA phenomenological discussion of Antonio Damasio’s theory of emotions10.13128/Phe_Mi-196522280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/a376c00e7dd14900b3f8afdbb3c95c5d2016-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7060https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 Antonio Damasio’s Theory of Emotions has deeply contributed to the understanding of the cognitive significance of affective states and of the relation between embodiment and cognition. Nevertheless, in this paper I argue that his account is inadequate from a phenomenological point of view. In the first place, I suggest that Damasio doesn’t provide a plausible analysis of the intentionality of emotions, ignoring both the intentional structure of feelings and the variety of objects they can be directed at. Secondly, I claim that by adopting a physiological approach to the study of emotions he can hardly account for their responsiveness to education and thus for the idea that it is possible to speak of responsibility also with regard to affective life. Besides, I suggest that Damasio doesn’t provide a plausible description of the way we become aware of other people’s affects, because he argues in favour of a separation between external behaviour and inner mental states. Anna BortolanRosenberg & SellierarticleDamasioemotionsfeelingsintersubjectivityintentionalityAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 1 (2016)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	Damasio emotions feelings intersubjectivity intentionality Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	Damasio emotions feelings intersubjectivity intentionality Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Anna Bortolan A phenomenological discussion of Antonio Damasio’s theory of emotions
description	Antonio Damasio’s Theory of Emotions has deeply contributed to the understanding of the cognitive significance of affective states and of the relation between embodiment and cognition. Nevertheless, in this paper I argue that his account is inadequate from a phenomenological point of view. In the first place, I suggest that Damasio doesn’t provide a plausible analysis of the intentionality of emotions, ignoring both the intentional structure of feelings and the variety of objects they can be directed at. Secondly, I claim that by adopting a physiological approach to the study of emotions he can hardly account for their responsiveness to education and thus for the idea that it is possible to speak of responsibility also with regard to affective life. Besides, I suggest that Damasio doesn’t provide a plausible description of the way we become aware of other people’s affects, because he argues in favour of a separation between external behaviour and inner mental states.
format	article
author	Anna Bortolan
author_facet	Anna Bortolan
author_sort	Anna Bortolan
title	A phenomenological discussion of Antonio Damasio’s theory of emotions
title_short	A phenomenological discussion of Antonio Damasio’s theory of emotions
title_full	A phenomenological discussion of Antonio Damasio’s theory of emotions
title_fullStr	A phenomenological discussion of Antonio Damasio’s theory of emotions
title_full_unstemmed	A phenomenological discussion of Antonio Damasio’s theory of emotions
title_sort	phenomenological discussion of antonio damasio’s theory of emotions
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2016
url	https://doaj.org/article/a376c00e7dd14900b3f8afdbb3c95c5d
work_keys_str_mv	AT annabortolan aphenomenologicaldiscussionofantoniodamasiostheoryofemotions AT annabortolan phenomenologicaldiscussionofantoniodamasiostheoryofemotions
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A phenomenological discussion of Antonio Damasio’s theory of emotions

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