A phenomenological discussion of Antonio Damasio’s theory of emotions
Antonio Damasio’s Theory of Emotions has deeply contributed to the understanding of the cognitive significance of affective states and of the relation between embodiment and cognition. Nevertheless, in this paper I argue that his account is inadequate from a phenomenological point of view. In the f...
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Autor principal: | Anna Bortolan |
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Formato: | article |
Lenguaje: | EN FR IT |
Publicado: |
Rosenberg & Sellier
2016
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/a376c00e7dd14900b3f8afdbb3c95c5d |
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