Emotions, intentions and their expressions: Anscombe on Wittgenstein’s stalking cat

In this paper, I explore the difference between expression of intention and expression of emotion through a discussion of a passage from G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention, where she claims that expression of intention, unlike expression of emotion, is “purely conventional”. I argue that this claim is gro...

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Autor principal:	Valérie Aucouturier
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	CA EN ES
Publicado:	Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament de Filosofia 2021
Materias:	G.E.M. Anscombe L. Wittgenstein expression emotion intention description Philosophy (General) B1-5802
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/a672e2900228460b82d8762d5b475f03
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id	oai:doaj.org-article:a672e2900228460b82d8762d5b475f03
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:a672e2900228460b82d8762d5b475f032021-12-05T09:53:50ZEmotions, intentions and their expressions: Anscombe on Wittgenstein’s stalking cat10.5565/rev/enrahonar.12860211-402X2014-881Xhttps://doaj.org/article/a672e2900228460b82d8762d5b475f032021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://revistes.uab.cat/enrahonar/article/view/1286https://doaj.org/toc/0211-402Xhttps://doaj.org/toc/2014-881X In this paper, I explore the difference between expression of intention and expression of emotion through a discussion of a passage from G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention, where she claims that expression of intention, unlike expression of emotion, is “purely conventional”. I argue that this claim is grounded on the fact that, although emotions can be described, expressions of emotion are not descriptions at all (e.g. of some present feeling or experience). Similarly, expressions of intention are not descriptions of a present state of mind but are rather the expression of a special sort of foreknowledge of a purported action. They are, in this respect, distinct from expression of emotion, since they are a description of some future happening (the purported action). Now, the centrally descriptive character of expressions of intention is what makes them “purely conventional”. But of course, Anscombe argues, one can have an intention without expressing it. And having an intention does not amount to having some description in mind. Valérie AucouturierUniversitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament de FilosofiaarticleG.E.M. AnscombeL. WittgensteinexpressionemotionintentiondescriptionPhilosophy (General)B1-5802CAENESEnrahonar: Quaderns de Filosofia, Vol 67 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	CA EN ES
topic	G.E.M. Anscombe L. Wittgenstein expression emotion intention description Philosophy (General) B1-5802
spellingShingle	G.E.M. Anscombe L. Wittgenstein expression emotion intention description Philosophy (General) B1-5802 Valérie Aucouturier Emotions, intentions and their expressions: Anscombe on Wittgenstein’s stalking cat
description	In this paper, I explore the difference between expression of intention and expression of emotion through a discussion of a passage from G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention, where she claims that expression of intention, unlike expression of emotion, is “purely conventional”. I argue that this claim is grounded on the fact that, although emotions can be described, expressions of emotion are not descriptions at all (e.g. of some present feeling or experience). Similarly, expressions of intention are not descriptions of a present state of mind but are rather the expression of a special sort of foreknowledge of a purported action. They are, in this respect, distinct from expression of emotion, since they are a description of some future happening (the purported action). Now, the centrally descriptive character of expressions of intention is what makes them “purely conventional”. But of course, Anscombe argues, one can have an intention without expressing it. And having an intention does not amount to having some description in mind.
format	article
author	Valérie Aucouturier
author_facet	Valérie Aucouturier
author_sort	Valérie Aucouturier
title	Emotions, intentions and their expressions: Anscombe on Wittgenstein’s stalking cat
title_short	Emotions, intentions and their expressions: Anscombe on Wittgenstein’s stalking cat
title_full	Emotions, intentions and their expressions: Anscombe on Wittgenstein’s stalking cat
title_fullStr	Emotions, intentions and their expressions: Anscombe on Wittgenstein’s stalking cat
title_full_unstemmed	Emotions, intentions and their expressions: Anscombe on Wittgenstein’s stalking cat
title_sort	emotions, intentions and their expressions: anscombe on wittgenstein’s stalking cat
publisher	Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament de Filosofia
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/a672e2900228460b82d8762d5b475f03
work_keys_str_mv	AT valerieaucouturier emotionsintentionsandtheirexpressionsanscombeonwittgensteinsstalkingcat
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Emotions, intentions and their expressions: Anscombe on Wittgenstein’s stalking cat

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