Power and fairness in a generalized ultimatum game.

Power is the ability to influence others towards the attainment of specific goals, and it is a fundamental force that shapes behavior at all levels of human existence. Several theories on the nature of power in social life exist, especially in the context of social influence. Yet, in bargaining situ...

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Autores principales:	Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia, Sergi Lozano, Dirk Helbing
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2014
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/a78a5a2b92794b939e5fb689cdeeb95f
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:a78a5a2b92794b939e5fb689cdeeb95f2021-11-18T08:16:44ZPower and fairness in a generalized ultimatum game.1932-620310.1371/journal.pone.0099039https://doaj.org/article/a78a5a2b92794b939e5fb689cdeeb95f2014-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/pmid/24905349/?tool=EBIhttps://doaj.org/toc/1932-6203Power is the ability to influence others towards the attainment of specific goals, and it is a fundamental force that shapes behavior at all levels of human existence. Several theories on the nature of power in social life exist, especially in the context of social influence. Yet, in bargaining situations, surprisingly little is known about its role in shaping social preferences. Such preferences are considered to be the main explanation for observed behavior in a wide range of experimental settings. In this work, we set out to understand the role of bargaining power in the stylized environment of a Generalized Ultimatum Game (GUG). We modify the payoff structure of the standard Ultimatum Game (UG) to investigate three situations: two in which the power balance is either against the proposer or against the responder, and a balanced situation. We find that other-regarding preferences, as measured by the amount of money donated by participants, do not change with the amount of power, but power changes the offers and acceptance rates systematically. Notably, unusually high acceptance rates for lower offers were observed. This finding suggests that social preferences may be invariant to the balance of power and confirms that the role of power on human behavior deserves more attention.Giovanni Luca CiampagliaSergi LozanoDirk HelbingPublic Library of Science (PLoS)articleMedicineRScienceQENPLoS ONE, Vol 9, Iss 6, p e99039 (2014)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia Sergi Lozano Dirk Helbing Power and fairness in a generalized ultimatum game.
description	Power is the ability to influence others towards the attainment of specific goals, and it is a fundamental force that shapes behavior at all levels of human existence. Several theories on the nature of power in social life exist, especially in the context of social influence. Yet, in bargaining situations, surprisingly little is known about its role in shaping social preferences. Such preferences are considered to be the main explanation for observed behavior in a wide range of experimental settings. In this work, we set out to understand the role of bargaining power in the stylized environment of a Generalized Ultimatum Game (GUG). We modify the payoff structure of the standard Ultimatum Game (UG) to investigate three situations: two in which the power balance is either against the proposer or against the responder, and a balanced situation. We find that other-regarding preferences, as measured by the amount of money donated by participants, do not change with the amount of power, but power changes the offers and acceptance rates systematically. Notably, unusually high acceptance rates for lower offers were observed. This finding suggests that social preferences may be invariant to the balance of power and confirms that the role of power on human behavior deserves more attention.
format	article
author	Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia Sergi Lozano Dirk Helbing
author_facet	Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia Sergi Lozano Dirk Helbing
author_sort	Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia
title	Power and fairness in a generalized ultimatum game.
title_short	Power and fairness in a generalized ultimatum game.
title_full	Power and fairness in a generalized ultimatum game.
title_fullStr	Power and fairness in a generalized ultimatum game.
title_full_unstemmed	Power and fairness in a generalized ultimatum game.
title_sort	power and fairness in a generalized ultimatum game.
publisher	Public Library of Science (PLoS)
publishDate	2014
url	https://doaj.org/article/a78a5a2b92794b939e5fb689cdeeb95f
work_keys_str_mv	AT giovannilucaciampaglia powerandfairnessinageneralizedultimatumgame AT sergilozano powerandfairnessinageneralizedultimatumgame AT dirkhelbing powerandfairnessinageneralizedultimatumgame
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Power and fairness in a generalized ultimatum game.

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