Propaedeutics in Practice

In this paper, I outline a propaedeutics of Islamic legal studies. I am using the term “propaedeutic” to refer to scholarship and pedagogy that introduces audiences to new material in a way that structures their curiosities and asks them to rethink commonplace familiar situations and assumptions. T...

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Autor principal:	Timothy Gutmann
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	International Institute of Islamic Thought 2020
Materias:	Islamic law; pedagogy; legal theory; public scholarship Islam BP1-253
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/a97847f237af406cacf31f23816cf5fd
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:a97847f237af406cacf31f23816cf5fd2021-12-02T19:41:21ZPropaedeutics in Practice10.35632/ajis.v37i3-4.7442690-37332690-3741https://doaj.org/article/a97847f237af406cacf31f23816cf5fd2020-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.ajis.org/index.php/ajiss/article/view/744https://doaj.org/toc/2690-3733https://doaj.org/toc/2690-3741 In this paper, I outline a propaedeutics of Islamic legal studies. I am using the term “propaedeutic” to refer to scholarship and pedagogy that introduces audiences to new material in a way that structures their curiosities and asks them to rethink commonplace familiar situations and assumptions. Those who teach about Islamic law in North American Islamic studies are working in an environment shaped by distinctive anxieties and preconceptions. Engaged scholarship informed by thinkers such as Wael Hallaq and Talal Asad seeks to disentangle conceptions of law from modern expectations of law enforcement, codification, and the supervisory neutrality of the state to consider other deliberations and practices of justice. Such propaedeutic scholarship should suggest how religious legal authority deals with more than just “spiritual” and “personal” matters. Imprecise introduction to the idea that Islamic legal opinion is non-binding can unintentionally imply that such opinion makes only moral suggestion that one chooses to follow or not. Scholars critical of Max Weber’s judgment that Islamic jurisprudence amounts to little more than arbitrary invocations of authority should be careful not to present Islamic jurists as merely creatively “free” to be unsystematic and their decisions inconsequential if following them is not coerced. Drawing on the work of Hussein Agrama, I explore the idea of fatwa discernment as guiding counsel directed not at adversarial procedure but at ethical self-formation. Finally, I consider Saba Mahmood’s account of religious difference to suggest how Islamic legal traditions might complicate liberal ideas of jurisdiction. Timothy GutmannInternational Institute of Islamic ThoughtarticleIslamic law; pedagogy; legal theory; public scholarshipIslamBP1-253ENAmerican Journal of Islam and Society, Vol 37, Iss 3-4 (2020)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Islamic law; pedagogy; legal theory; public scholarship Islam BP1-253
spellingShingle	Islamic law; pedagogy; legal theory; public scholarship Islam BP1-253 Timothy Gutmann Propaedeutics in Practice
description	In this paper, I outline a propaedeutics of Islamic legal studies. I am using the term “propaedeutic” to refer to scholarship and pedagogy that introduces audiences to new material in a way that structures their curiosities and asks them to rethink commonplace familiar situations and assumptions. Those who teach about Islamic law in North American Islamic studies are working in an environment shaped by distinctive anxieties and preconceptions. Engaged scholarship informed by thinkers such as Wael Hallaq and Talal Asad seeks to disentangle conceptions of law from modern expectations of law enforcement, codification, and the supervisory neutrality of the state to consider other deliberations and practices of justice. Such propaedeutic scholarship should suggest how religious legal authority deals with more than just “spiritual” and “personal” matters. Imprecise introduction to the idea that Islamic legal opinion is non-binding can unintentionally imply that such opinion makes only moral suggestion that one chooses to follow or not. Scholars critical of Max Weber’s judgment that Islamic jurisprudence amounts to little more than arbitrary invocations of authority should be careful not to present Islamic jurists as merely creatively “free” to be unsystematic and their decisions inconsequential if following them is not coerced. Drawing on the work of Hussein Agrama, I explore the idea of fatwa discernment as guiding counsel directed not at adversarial procedure but at ethical self-formation. Finally, I consider Saba Mahmood’s account of religious difference to suggest how Islamic legal traditions might complicate liberal ideas of jurisdiction.
format	article
author	Timothy Gutmann
author_facet	Timothy Gutmann
author_sort	Timothy Gutmann
title	Propaedeutics in Practice
title_short	Propaedeutics in Practice
title_full	Propaedeutics in Practice
title_fullStr	Propaedeutics in Practice
title_full_unstemmed	Propaedeutics in Practice
title_sort	propaedeutics in practice
publisher	International Institute of Islamic Thought
publishDate	2020
url	https://doaj.org/article/a97847f237af406cacf31f23816cf5fd
work_keys_str_mv	AT timothygutmann propaedeuticsinpractice
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Propaedeutics in Practice

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