Husserl's Concept of Position-taking and Second Nature

I argue that Husserl’s concept of position-taking, Stellungnahme, is adequate to understand the idea of second nature as an issue of philosophical anthropology. I claim that the methodological focus must be the living subject that acts and lives among others, and that the notion of second nature mu...

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Autor principal:	Alejandro Arango
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
Materias:	second nature position-taking Husserl habit Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/a9b7cd02d09e40dd8dce8209aa8a5018
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:a9b7cd02d09e40dd8dce8209aa8a50182021-12-02T09:29:57ZHusserl's Concept of Position-taking and Second Nature10.13128/Phe_Mi-195612280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/a9b7cd02d09e40dd8dce8209aa8a50182016-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7155https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 I argue that Husserl’s concept of position-taking, Stellungnahme, is adequate to understand the idea of second nature as an issue of philosophical anthropology. I claim that the methodological focus must be the living subject that acts and lives among others, and that the notion of second nature must respond to precisely this fundamental active character of subjectivity. The appropriate concept should satisfy two additional desiderata. First, it should be able to develop alongside the biological, psychological, and social individual development. Second, it should be able to underlie the vast diversity of human beings within and across communities. As possible candidates, I contrast position-taking with two types of habit-like concepts: instinct and habitus, on the one hand, and customary habits, on the other. I argue that position-taking represents the active aspect of the subject while the habit-like concepts are passive. A subject’s position-takings and ensuing comportments are tied together by motivations, which evince a certain consistency, and for this reason are expression of the subject’s identity. I conclude by nuancing the relation between Stellungnahme and passivity. Passivity is deemed necessary to action but subservient to it; position-taking is thought to be prior to passivity. Alejandro ArangoRosenberg & Sellierarticlesecond natureposition-takingHusserlhabitAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 6 (2016)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	second nature position-taking Husserl habit Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	second nature position-taking Husserl habit Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Alejandro Arango Husserl's Concept of Position-taking and Second Nature
description	I argue that Husserl’s concept of position-taking, Stellungnahme, is adequate to understand the idea of second nature as an issue of philosophical anthropology. I claim that the methodological focus must be the living subject that acts and lives among others, and that the notion of second nature must respond to precisely this fundamental active character of subjectivity. The appropriate concept should satisfy two additional desiderata. First, it should be able to develop alongside the biological, psychological, and social individual development. Second, it should be able to underlie the vast diversity of human beings within and across communities. As possible candidates, I contrast position-taking with two types of habit-like concepts: instinct and habitus, on the one hand, and customary habits, on the other. I argue that position-taking represents the active aspect of the subject while the habit-like concepts are passive. A subject’s position-takings and ensuing comportments are tied together by motivations, which evince a certain consistency, and for this reason are expression of the subject’s identity. I conclude by nuancing the relation between Stellungnahme and passivity. Passivity is deemed necessary to action but subservient to it; position-taking is thought to be prior to passivity.
format	article
author	Alejandro Arango
author_facet	Alejandro Arango
author_sort	Alejandro Arango
title	Husserl's Concept of Position-taking and Second Nature
title_short	Husserl's Concept of Position-taking and Second Nature
title_full	Husserl's Concept of Position-taking and Second Nature
title_fullStr	Husserl's Concept of Position-taking and Second Nature
title_full_unstemmed	Husserl's Concept of Position-taking and Second Nature
title_sort	husserl's concept of position-taking and second nature
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2016
url	https://doaj.org/article/a9b7cd02d09e40dd8dce8209aa8a5018
work_keys_str_mv	AT alejandroarango husserlsconceptofpositiontakingandsecondnature
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Husserl's Concept of Position-taking and Second Nature

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