Experiential ownership and body ownership are different phenomena
Abstract Body ownership concerns what it is like to feel a body part or a full body as mine, and has become a prominent area of study. We propose that there is a closely related type of bodily self-consciousness largely neglected by researchers—experiential ownership. It refers to the sense that I a...
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Nature Portfolio
2021
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oai:doaj.org-article:ab5c1fabcaf5421ba3c10d4c5c5438172021-12-02T16:51:09ZExperiential ownership and body ownership are different phenomena10.1038/s41598-021-90014-y2045-2322https://doaj.org/article/ab5c1fabcaf5421ba3c10d4c5c5438172021-05-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-90014-yhttps://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract Body ownership concerns what it is like to feel a body part or a full body as mine, and has become a prominent area of study. We propose that there is a closely related type of bodily self-consciousness largely neglected by researchers—experiential ownership. It refers to the sense that I am the one who is having a conscious experience. Are body ownership and experiential ownership actually the same phenomenon or are they genuinely different? In our experiments, the participant watched a rubber hand or someone else’s body from the first-person perspective and was touched either synchronously or asynchronously. The main findings: (1) The sense of body ownership was hindered in the asynchronous conditions of both the body-part and the full-body experiments. However, a strong sense of experiential ownership was observed in those conditions. (2) We found the opposite when the participants’ responses were measured after tactile stimulations had ceased for 5 s. In the synchronous conditions of another set of body-part and full-body experiments, only experiential ownership was blocked but not body ownership. These results demonstrate for the first time the double dissociation between body ownership and experiential ownership. Experiential ownership is indeed a distinct type of bodily self-consciousness.Caleb LiangWen-Hsiang LinTai-Yuan ChangChi-Hong ChenChen-Wei WuWen-Yeo ChenHsu-Chia HuangYen-Tung LeeNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 11, Iss 1, Pp 1-11 (2021) |
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Medicine R Science Q Caleb Liang Wen-Hsiang Lin Tai-Yuan Chang Chi-Hong Chen Chen-Wei Wu Wen-Yeo Chen Hsu-Chia Huang Yen-Tung Lee Experiential ownership and body ownership are different phenomena |
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Abstract Body ownership concerns what it is like to feel a body part or a full body as mine, and has become a prominent area of study. We propose that there is a closely related type of bodily self-consciousness largely neglected by researchers—experiential ownership. It refers to the sense that I am the one who is having a conscious experience. Are body ownership and experiential ownership actually the same phenomenon or are they genuinely different? In our experiments, the participant watched a rubber hand or someone else’s body from the first-person perspective and was touched either synchronously or asynchronously. The main findings: (1) The sense of body ownership was hindered in the asynchronous conditions of both the body-part and the full-body experiments. However, a strong sense of experiential ownership was observed in those conditions. (2) We found the opposite when the participants’ responses were measured after tactile stimulations had ceased for 5 s. In the synchronous conditions of another set of body-part and full-body experiments, only experiential ownership was blocked but not body ownership. These results demonstrate for the first time the double dissociation between body ownership and experiential ownership. Experiential ownership is indeed a distinct type of bodily self-consciousness. |
format |
article |
author |
Caleb Liang Wen-Hsiang Lin Tai-Yuan Chang Chi-Hong Chen Chen-Wei Wu Wen-Yeo Chen Hsu-Chia Huang Yen-Tung Lee |
author_facet |
Caleb Liang Wen-Hsiang Lin Tai-Yuan Chang Chi-Hong Chen Chen-Wei Wu Wen-Yeo Chen Hsu-Chia Huang Yen-Tung Lee |
author_sort |
Caleb Liang |
title |
Experiential ownership and body ownership are different phenomena |
title_short |
Experiential ownership and body ownership are different phenomena |
title_full |
Experiential ownership and body ownership are different phenomena |
title_fullStr |
Experiential ownership and body ownership are different phenomena |
title_full_unstemmed |
Experiential ownership and body ownership are different phenomena |
title_sort |
experiential ownership and body ownership are different phenomena |
publisher |
Nature Portfolio |
publishDate |
2021 |
url |
https://doaj.org/article/ab5c1fabcaf5421ba3c10d4c5c543817 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT calebliang experientialownershipandbodyownershiparedifferentphenomena AT wenhsianglin experientialownershipandbodyownershiparedifferentphenomena AT taiyuanchang experientialownershipandbodyownershiparedifferentphenomena AT chihongchen experientialownershipandbodyownershiparedifferentphenomena AT chenweiwu experientialownershipandbodyownershiparedifferentphenomena AT wenyeochen experientialownershipandbodyownershiparedifferentphenomena AT hsuchiahuang experientialownershipandbodyownershiparedifferentphenomena AT yentunglee experientialownershipandbodyownershiparedifferentphenomena |
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1718382999740874752 |