Iran’s Long Reach
This short analytical book attempts to serve American decision-maker policy choices with respect to the “pivotal” country of Iran. The pivotal state thesis has sought to organize the United States’ national security strategy after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war.1Malone...
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| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | EN |
| Publicado: |
International Institute of Islamic Thought
2010
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/ad1417882d9547f8904c2416c492016e |
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| Sumario: | This short analytical book attempts to serve American decision-maker policy
choices with respect to the “pivotal” country of Iran. The pivotal state thesis
has sought to organize the United States’ national security strategy after the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war.1Maloney applies it
to the Iranian case, given that country’s geostrategic value and significant role
in global issues and negotiations (pp. 4-5). She adopts the thesis’ main
assumption that by investing attention and resources in regional heavyweights,
the United States can benefit from the “multiplier” effect of their
weight. Arguing that as the United States seeks to change its strategic
approach toward the region, the author posits that focusing on the Muslim
world’s pivotal states will help prioritize challenges and opportunities and
thus better serve its vital interests (p. 5). She proceeds to do so by making the
case for Iran’s crucial importance while outlining what she perceives to be its
political, economic, security and theological dilemmas – presumably so that
Washington and its allies can take advantage of them.
The study also attempts to examine the shifts from reformist (Khatami)
toward more radical (Ahmadinejad) politics in Iran’s domestic scene. She
traces the reasons why the Iranian “reform movement,” under Khatami
failed and attributes that outcome to self-imposed constraints (redlines), fear
of bringing about instability, and the movement’s elitist structure (pp. 12-
13). Maloney also points to Ahmadinejad’s “perverse” but “compelling”
incentive to preserve the long-standing antagonism toward the United
States. She expresses her concern that such shifts may serve to undermine
any remaining international consensus necessary to address “problematic
elements of Iran’s foreign policy” (p. 23) ...
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