Evolutionary game analysis on the recycling strategy of household medical device enterprises under government dynamic rewards and punishments

Under the background of the aging population and the improvement of people's quality of life, the demand for household medical devices is expanding, which has huge market potential. However, the recycling of waste household medical devices has become a problem that must be faced by the market e...

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Autores principales:	Zheng Liu, Lingling Lang, Lingling Li, Yuanjun Zhao, Lihua Shi
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	AIMS Press 2021
Materias:	household medical devices evolutionary game government supervision dynamic strategy punishment and subsidy measures Biotechnology TP248.13-248.65 Mathematics QA1-939
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/ae29fe4471e14372becf0917357a6521
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:ae29fe4471e14372becf0917357a65212021-11-11T01:29:31ZEvolutionary game analysis on the recycling strategy of household medical device enterprises under government dynamic rewards and punishments10.3934/mbe.20213201551-0018https://doaj.org/article/ae29fe4471e14372becf0917357a65212021-07-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.aimspress.com/article/doi/10.3934/mbe.2021320?viewType=HTMLhttps://doaj.org/toc/1551-0018Under the background of the aging population and the improvement of people's quality of life, the demand for household medical devices is expanding, which has huge market potential. However, the recycling of waste household medical devices has become a problem that must be faced by the market expansion. In order to reduce the environmental pollution caused by abandoned household medical devices, based on the dynamic punishment and dynamic subsidy measures adopted by the government, the evolutionary game model between the government and the household medical device enterprises is constructed. The strategic choice of the government and the domestic medical equipment enterprises is studied from the perspective of system dynamics. It is found that when the government adopts static measures, there is no stable equilibrium point in the game between the government and enterprises, while when the government adopts dynamic punishment or subsidies, there is a stable equilibrium point in the evolutionary game. In addition, the government can increase the penalty or reduce the subsidy to promote the probability of household medical device enterprises to choose recycling strategy and reduce environmental pollution.Zheng LiuLingling Lang Lingling LiYuanjun ZhaoLihua ShiAIMS Pressarticlehousehold medical devicesevolutionary gamegovernment supervisiondynamic strategypunishment and subsidy measuresBiotechnologyTP248.13-248.65MathematicsQA1-939ENMathematical Biosciences and Engineering, Vol 18, Iss 5, Pp 6434-6451 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	household medical devices evolutionary game government supervision dynamic strategy punishment and subsidy measures Biotechnology TP248.13-248.65 Mathematics QA1-939
spellingShingle	household medical devices evolutionary game government supervision dynamic strategy punishment and subsidy measures Biotechnology TP248.13-248.65 Mathematics QA1-939 Zheng Liu Lingling Lang Lingling Li Yuanjun Zhao Lihua Shi Evolutionary game analysis on the recycling strategy of household medical device enterprises under government dynamic rewards and punishments
description	Under the background of the aging population and the improvement of people's quality of life, the demand for household medical devices is expanding, which has huge market potential. However, the recycling of waste household medical devices has become a problem that must be faced by the market expansion. In order to reduce the environmental pollution caused by abandoned household medical devices, based on the dynamic punishment and dynamic subsidy measures adopted by the government, the evolutionary game model between the government and the household medical device enterprises is constructed. The strategic choice of the government and the domestic medical equipment enterprises is studied from the perspective of system dynamics. It is found that when the government adopts static measures, there is no stable equilibrium point in the game between the government and enterprises, while when the government adopts dynamic punishment or subsidies, there is a stable equilibrium point in the evolutionary game. In addition, the government can increase the penalty or reduce the subsidy to promote the probability of household medical device enterprises to choose recycling strategy and reduce environmental pollution.
format	article
author	Zheng Liu Lingling Lang Lingling Li Yuanjun Zhao Lihua Shi
author_facet	Zheng Liu Lingling Lang Lingling Li Yuanjun Zhao Lihua Shi
author_sort	Zheng Liu
title	Evolutionary game analysis on the recycling strategy of household medical device enterprises under government dynamic rewards and punishments
title_short	Evolutionary game analysis on the recycling strategy of household medical device enterprises under government dynamic rewards and punishments
title_full	Evolutionary game analysis on the recycling strategy of household medical device enterprises under government dynamic rewards and punishments
title_fullStr	Evolutionary game analysis on the recycling strategy of household medical device enterprises under government dynamic rewards and punishments
title_full_unstemmed	Evolutionary game analysis on the recycling strategy of household medical device enterprises under government dynamic rewards and punishments
title_sort	evolutionary game analysis on the recycling strategy of household medical device enterprises under government dynamic rewards and punishments
publisher	AIMS Press
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/ae29fe4471e14372becf0917357a6521
work_keys_str_mv	AT zhengliu evolutionarygameanalysisontherecyclingstrategyofhouseholdmedicaldeviceenterprisesundergovernmentdynamicrewardsandpunishments AT linglinglang evolutionarygameanalysisontherecyclingstrategyofhouseholdmedicaldeviceenterprisesundergovernmentdynamicrewardsandpunishments AT linglingli evolutionarygameanalysisontherecyclingstrategyofhouseholdmedicaldeviceenterprisesundergovernmentdynamicrewardsandpunishments AT yuanjunzhao evolutionarygameanalysisontherecyclingstrategyofhouseholdmedicaldeviceenterprisesundergovernmentdynamicrewardsandpunishments AT lihuashi evolutionarygameanalysisontherecyclingstrategyofhouseholdmedicaldeviceenterprisesundergovernmentdynamicrewardsandpunishments
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Evolutionary game analysis on the recycling strategy of household medical device enterprises under government dynamic rewards and punishments

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