Automated Generation of Masked Hardware
Masking has been recognized as a sound and secure countermeasure for cryptographic implementations, protecting against physical side-channel attacks. Even though many different masking schemes have been presented over time, design and implementation of protected cryptographic Integrated Circuits (I...
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Ruhr-Universität Bochum
2021
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oai:doaj.org-article:b229173ac2bd4128a482609c7ed915862021-11-19T14:36:06ZAutomated Generation of Masked Hardware10.46586/tches.v2022.i1.589-6292569-2925https://doaj.org/article/b229173ac2bd4128a482609c7ed915862021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9308https://doaj.org/toc/2569-2925 Masking has been recognized as a sound and secure countermeasure for cryptographic implementations, protecting against physical side-channel attacks. Even though many different masking schemes have been presented over time, design and implementation of protected cryptographic Integrated Circuits (ICs) remains a challenging task. More specifically, correct and efficient implementation usually requires manual interactions accompanied by longstanding experience in hardware design and physical security. To this end, design and implementation of masked hardware often proves to be an error-prone task for engineers and practitioners. As a result, our novel tool for automated generation of masked hardware (AGEMA) allows even inexperienced engineers and hardware designers to create secure and efficient masked cryptograhic circuits originating from an unprotected design. More precisely, exploiting the concepts of Probe-Isolating Non-Interference (PINI) for secure composition of masked circuits, our tool provides various processing techniques to transform an unprotected design into a secure one, eventually accelerating and safeguarding the process of masking cryptographic hardware. Ultimately, we evaluate our tool in several case studies, emphasizing different trade-offs for the transformation techniques with respect to common performance metrics, such as latency, area, and randomness. David KnichelAmir MoradiNicolai MüllerPascal SasdrichRuhr-Universität BochumarticleSide-Channel AnalysisMaskingHardwareComposable GadgetComputer engineering. Computer hardwareTK7885-7895Information technologyT58.5-58.64ENTransactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Vol 2022, Iss 1 (2021) |
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Side-Channel Analysis Masking Hardware Composable Gadget Computer engineering. Computer hardware TK7885-7895 Information technology T58.5-58.64 |
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Side-Channel Analysis Masking Hardware Composable Gadget Computer engineering. Computer hardware TK7885-7895 Information technology T58.5-58.64 David Knichel Amir Moradi Nicolai Müller Pascal Sasdrich Automated Generation of Masked Hardware |
description |
Masking has been recognized as a sound and secure countermeasure for cryptographic implementations, protecting against physical side-channel attacks. Even though many different masking schemes have been presented over time, design and implementation of protected cryptographic Integrated Circuits (ICs) remains a challenging task. More specifically, correct and efficient implementation usually requires manual interactions accompanied by longstanding experience in hardware design and physical security. To this end, design and implementation of masked hardware often proves to be an error-prone task for engineers and practitioners. As a result, our novel tool for automated generation of masked hardware (AGEMA) allows even inexperienced engineers and hardware designers to create secure and efficient masked cryptograhic circuits originating from an unprotected design. More precisely, exploiting the concepts of Probe-Isolating Non-Interference (PINI) for secure composition of masked circuits, our tool provides various processing techniques to transform an unprotected design into a secure one, eventually accelerating and safeguarding the process of masking cryptographic hardware. Ultimately, we evaluate our tool in several case studies, emphasizing different trade-offs for the transformation techniques with respect to common performance metrics, such as latency, area, and
randomness.
|
format |
article |
author |
David Knichel Amir Moradi Nicolai Müller Pascal Sasdrich |
author_facet |
David Knichel Amir Moradi Nicolai Müller Pascal Sasdrich |
author_sort |
David Knichel |
title |
Automated Generation of Masked Hardware |
title_short |
Automated Generation of Masked Hardware |
title_full |
Automated Generation of Masked Hardware |
title_fullStr |
Automated Generation of Masked Hardware |
title_full_unstemmed |
Automated Generation of Masked Hardware |
title_sort |
automated generation of masked hardware |
publisher |
Ruhr-Universität Bochum |
publishDate |
2021 |
url |
https://doaj.org/article/b229173ac2bd4128a482609c7ed91586 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT davidknichel automatedgenerationofmaskedhardware AT amirmoradi automatedgenerationofmaskedhardware AT nicolaimuller automatedgenerationofmaskedhardware AT pascalsasdrich automatedgenerationofmaskedhardware |
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1718420090731364352 |