Automated Generation of Masked Hardware

Masking has been recognized as a sound and secure countermeasure for cryptographic implementations, protecting against physical side-channel attacks. Even though many different masking schemes have been presented over time, design and implementation of protected cryptographic Integrated Circuits (I...

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Autores principales: David Knichel, Amir Moradi, Nicolai Müller, Pascal Sasdrich
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Lenguaje:EN
Publicado: Ruhr-Universität Bochum 2021
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/b229173ac2bd4128a482609c7ed91586
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:b229173ac2bd4128a482609c7ed915862021-11-19T14:36:06ZAutomated Generation of Masked Hardware10.46586/tches.v2022.i1.589-6292569-2925https://doaj.org/article/b229173ac2bd4128a482609c7ed915862021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9308https://doaj.org/toc/2569-2925 Masking has been recognized as a sound and secure countermeasure for cryptographic implementations, protecting against physical side-channel attacks. Even though many different masking schemes have been presented over time, design and implementation of protected cryptographic Integrated Circuits (ICs) remains a challenging task. More specifically, correct and efficient implementation usually requires manual interactions accompanied by longstanding experience in hardware design and physical security. To this end, design and implementation of masked hardware often proves to be an error-prone task for engineers and practitioners. As a result, our novel tool for automated generation of masked hardware (AGEMA) allows even inexperienced engineers and hardware designers to create secure and efficient masked cryptograhic circuits originating from an unprotected design. More precisely, exploiting the concepts of Probe-Isolating Non-Interference (PINI) for secure composition of masked circuits, our tool provides various processing techniques to transform an unprotected design into a secure one, eventually accelerating and safeguarding the process of masking cryptographic hardware. Ultimately, we evaluate our tool in several case studies, emphasizing different trade-offs for the transformation techniques with respect to common performance metrics, such as latency, area, and randomness. David KnichelAmir MoradiNicolai MüllerPascal SasdrichRuhr-Universität BochumarticleSide-Channel AnalysisMaskingHardwareComposable GadgetComputer engineering. Computer hardwareTK7885-7895Information technologyT58.5-58.64ENTransactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Vol 2022, Iss 1 (2021)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
topic Side-Channel Analysis
Masking
Hardware
Composable Gadget
Computer engineering. Computer hardware
TK7885-7895
Information technology
T58.5-58.64
spellingShingle Side-Channel Analysis
Masking
Hardware
Composable Gadget
Computer engineering. Computer hardware
TK7885-7895
Information technology
T58.5-58.64
David Knichel
Amir Moradi
Nicolai Müller
Pascal Sasdrich
Automated Generation of Masked Hardware
description Masking has been recognized as a sound and secure countermeasure for cryptographic implementations, protecting against physical side-channel attacks. Even though many different masking schemes have been presented over time, design and implementation of protected cryptographic Integrated Circuits (ICs) remains a challenging task. More specifically, correct and efficient implementation usually requires manual interactions accompanied by longstanding experience in hardware design and physical security. To this end, design and implementation of masked hardware often proves to be an error-prone task for engineers and practitioners. As a result, our novel tool for automated generation of masked hardware (AGEMA) allows even inexperienced engineers and hardware designers to create secure and efficient masked cryptograhic circuits originating from an unprotected design. More precisely, exploiting the concepts of Probe-Isolating Non-Interference (PINI) for secure composition of masked circuits, our tool provides various processing techniques to transform an unprotected design into a secure one, eventually accelerating and safeguarding the process of masking cryptographic hardware. Ultimately, we evaluate our tool in several case studies, emphasizing different trade-offs for the transformation techniques with respect to common performance metrics, such as latency, area, and randomness.
format article
author David Knichel
Amir Moradi
Nicolai Müller
Pascal Sasdrich
author_facet David Knichel
Amir Moradi
Nicolai Müller
Pascal Sasdrich
author_sort David Knichel
title Automated Generation of Masked Hardware
title_short Automated Generation of Masked Hardware
title_full Automated Generation of Masked Hardware
title_fullStr Automated Generation of Masked Hardware
title_full_unstemmed Automated Generation of Masked Hardware
title_sort automated generation of masked hardware
publisher Ruhr-Universität Bochum
publishDate 2021
url https://doaj.org/article/b229173ac2bd4128a482609c7ed91586
work_keys_str_mv AT davidknichel automatedgenerationofmaskedhardware
AT amirmoradi automatedgenerationofmaskedhardware
AT nicolaimuller automatedgenerationofmaskedhardware
AT pascalsasdrich automatedgenerationofmaskedhardware
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