Does investors react in long-term? The case of Malaysian acquisition

This study examines long-run stock performance for acquirers from years 2000 to 2013. Since acquisitions create agency problem and companies in Malaysia exhibit concentrated ownership structures, this study aims to investigate four major objectives which consist of the effects of family control, blo...

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Autores principales:	Norhamiza Ishak, Kamarun Nisham Taufil Mohd, Hanita Kadir Shahar
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Taylor & Francis Group 2020
Materias:	acquisition long-run acquire board structure malaysia Business HF5001-6182 Management. Industrial management HD28-70
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/b29e19a5b1d743779db34a858a09e35b
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:b29e19a5b1d743779db34a858a09e35b2021-12-02T18:23:50ZDoes investors react in long-term? The case of Malaysian acquisition2331-197510.1080/23311975.2020.1857593https://doaj.org/article/b29e19a5b1d743779db34a858a09e35b2020-01-01T00:00:00Zhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2020.1857593https://doaj.org/toc/2331-1975This study examines long-run stock performance for acquirers from years 2000 to 2013. Since acquisitions create agency problem and companies in Malaysia exhibit concentrated ownership structures, this study aims to investigate four major objectives which consist of the effects of family control, blockholder activism, board structures and deal characteristics on stock performance of acquirers. In addressing these objectives, the abnormal returns over 36 months are adopted as the proxy for the long-run stock performance, respectively. Moreover, ordinary least squares regression methods are used to examine the effects of the 16 factors on abnormal returns. The results show that Malaysian market can be considered as efficient, as most of the analyses show that the performance of acquirers does not differ from those of the matching firms. The findings imply that managers of family-controlled firms do not have to worry about investors penalizing them, as long as they engage in value-creating acquisitions. Moreover, institutional blockholders should play an active role if they want to protect their investments. Finally, investors have to realize that over the long run, there is no trading strategy that could be adopted to earn abnormal profit.Norhamiza IshakKamarun Nisham Taufil MohdHanita Kadir ShaharTaylor & Francis Grouparticleacquisitionlong-runacquireboard structuremalaysiaBusinessHF5001-6182Management. Industrial managementHD28-70ENCogent Business & Management, Vol 7, Iss 1 (2020)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	acquisition long-run acquire board structure malaysia Business HF5001-6182 Management. Industrial management HD28-70
spellingShingle	acquisition long-run acquire board structure malaysia Business HF5001-6182 Management. Industrial management HD28-70 Norhamiza Ishak Kamarun Nisham Taufil Mohd Hanita Kadir Shahar Does investors react in long-term? The case of Malaysian acquisition
description	This study examines long-run stock performance for acquirers from years 2000 to 2013. Since acquisitions create agency problem and companies in Malaysia exhibit concentrated ownership structures, this study aims to investigate four major objectives which consist of the effects of family control, blockholder activism, board structures and deal characteristics on stock performance of acquirers. In addressing these objectives, the abnormal returns over 36 months are adopted as the proxy for the long-run stock performance, respectively. Moreover, ordinary least squares regression methods are used to examine the effects of the 16 factors on abnormal returns. The results show that Malaysian market can be considered as efficient, as most of the analyses show that the performance of acquirers does not differ from those of the matching firms. The findings imply that managers of family-controlled firms do not have to worry about investors penalizing them, as long as they engage in value-creating acquisitions. Moreover, institutional blockholders should play an active role if they want to protect their investments. Finally, investors have to realize that over the long run, there is no trading strategy that could be adopted to earn abnormal profit.
format	article
author	Norhamiza Ishak Kamarun Nisham Taufil Mohd Hanita Kadir Shahar
author_facet	Norhamiza Ishak Kamarun Nisham Taufil Mohd Hanita Kadir Shahar
author_sort	Norhamiza Ishak
title	Does investors react in long-term? The case of Malaysian acquisition
title_short	Does investors react in long-term? The case of Malaysian acquisition
title_full	Does investors react in long-term? The case of Malaysian acquisition
title_fullStr	Does investors react in long-term? The case of Malaysian acquisition
title_full_unstemmed	Does investors react in long-term? The case of Malaysian acquisition
title_sort	does investors react in long-term? the case of malaysian acquisition
publisher	Taylor & Francis Group
publishDate	2020
url	https://doaj.org/article/b29e19a5b1d743779db34a858a09e35b
work_keys_str_mv	AT norhamizaishak doesinvestorsreactinlongtermthecaseofmalaysianacquisition AT kamarunnishamtaufilmohd doesinvestorsreactinlongtermthecaseofmalaysianacquisition AT hanitakadirshahar doesinvestorsreactinlongtermthecaseofmalaysianacquisition
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Does investors react in long-term? The case of Malaysian acquisition

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