Governing the European Intelligence: Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union

Since intelligence is an essential part of national security, a high volume of cooperation in this area is not expected. An assessment of the literature shows that there are several obstacles to intelligence cooperation. More precisely, states are reluctant to involve in intelligence cooperation bec...

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Autores principales: Ahmet Ateş, Anıl Erkan
Formato: article
Lenguaje:EN
TR
Publicado: International Journal of Politic and Security 2021
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Acceso en línea:https://doi.org/10.53451/ijps.900302
https://doaj.org/article/b531cf1981704023ad8b92dd1e6193d4
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:b531cf1981704023ad8b92dd1e6193d42021-11-16T08:53:22ZGoverning the European Intelligence: Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation in the European Unionhttps://doi.org/10.53451/ijps.9003022667-8268https://doaj.org/article/b531cf1981704023ad8b92dd1e6193d42021-10-01T00:00:00Zhttps://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/ijps/issue/64480/900302https://doaj.org/toc/2667-8268Since intelligence is an essential part of national security, a high volume of cooperation in this area is not expected. An assessment of the literature shows that there are several obstacles to intelligence cooperation. More precisely, states are reluctant to involve in intelligence cooperation because of trust factors and other factors such as bureaucratic culture and resistance, regime type, lack of normative motivation and shared identities. Even if they are compelled to cooperate, they prefer bilateral intelligence cooperation. However, due to the globalization of national security threats in the last two decades, intelligence organizations are currently obliged to cooperate multilaterally even though they do not prefer to do so. Multilateral intelligence cooperation within the European Union is a unique example of relatively successful multilateral intelligence cooperation. On the one hand, official European intelligence agencies INTCEN and Europol provide the legal framework of intelligence cooperation among the Union. On the other hand, informal channels such as the Club of Berne are also proven useful for the EU’s intelligence cooperation. We argue that the relative success of European intelligence cooperation derives from at least three factors. These are institutionalized demand for intelligence governance, the delegated authority of the members of the EU’s (epistemic) intelligence community, and its ability to set the national security agenda of the EU.Ahmet AteşAnıl ErkanInternational Journal of Politic and Securityarticleintelligenceglobal governancecooperationeuropean unionPolitical science (General)JA1-92ENTRInternational Journal of Politic and Security, Vol 3, Iss 3, Pp 230-250 (2021)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
TR
topic intelligence
global governance
cooperation
european union
Political science (General)
JA1-92
spellingShingle intelligence
global governance
cooperation
european union
Political science (General)
JA1-92
Ahmet Ateş
Anıl Erkan
Governing the European Intelligence: Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union
description Since intelligence is an essential part of national security, a high volume of cooperation in this area is not expected. An assessment of the literature shows that there are several obstacles to intelligence cooperation. More precisely, states are reluctant to involve in intelligence cooperation because of trust factors and other factors such as bureaucratic culture and resistance, regime type, lack of normative motivation and shared identities. Even if they are compelled to cooperate, they prefer bilateral intelligence cooperation. However, due to the globalization of national security threats in the last two decades, intelligence organizations are currently obliged to cooperate multilaterally even though they do not prefer to do so. Multilateral intelligence cooperation within the European Union is a unique example of relatively successful multilateral intelligence cooperation. On the one hand, official European intelligence agencies INTCEN and Europol provide the legal framework of intelligence cooperation among the Union. On the other hand, informal channels such as the Club of Berne are also proven useful for the EU’s intelligence cooperation. We argue that the relative success of European intelligence cooperation derives from at least three factors. These are institutionalized demand for intelligence governance, the delegated authority of the members of the EU’s (epistemic) intelligence community, and its ability to set the national security agenda of the EU.
format article
author Ahmet Ateş
Anıl Erkan
author_facet Ahmet Ateş
Anıl Erkan
author_sort Ahmet Ateş
title Governing the European Intelligence: Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union
title_short Governing the European Intelligence: Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union
title_full Governing the European Intelligence: Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union
title_fullStr Governing the European Intelligence: Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union
title_full_unstemmed Governing the European Intelligence: Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union
title_sort governing the european intelligence: multilateral intelligence cooperation in the european union
publisher International Journal of Politic and Security
publishDate 2021
url https://doi.org/10.53451/ijps.900302
https://doaj.org/article/b531cf1981704023ad8b92dd1e6193d4
work_keys_str_mv AT ahmetates governingtheeuropeanintelligencemultilateralintelligencecooperationintheeuropeanunion
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