Evolution of prosocial punishment in unstructured and structured populations and in the presence of antisocial punishment.

A large body of empirical evidence suggests that altruistic punishment abounds in human societies. Based on such evidence, it is suggested that punishment serves an important role in promoting cooperation in humans and possibly other species. However, as punishment is costly, its evolution is subjec...

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Autor principal:	Mohammad Salahshour
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2021
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/b59d28618fd84fdc96084a6f0ff0de35
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:b59d28618fd84fdc96084a6f0ff0de352021-12-02T20:18:34ZEvolution of prosocial punishment in unstructured and structured populations and in the presence of antisocial punishment.1932-620310.1371/journal.pone.0254860https://doaj.org/article/b59d28618fd84fdc96084a6f0ff0de352021-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0254860https://doaj.org/toc/1932-6203A large body of empirical evidence suggests that altruistic punishment abounds in human societies. Based on such evidence, it is suggested that punishment serves an important role in promoting cooperation in humans and possibly other species. However, as punishment is costly, its evolution is subject to the same problem that it tries to address. To suppress this so-called second-order free-rider problem, known theoretical models on the evolution of punishment resort to one of the few established mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation. This leaves the question of whether altruistic punishment can evolve and give rise to the evolution of cooperation in the absence of such auxiliary cooperation-favoring mechanisms unaddressed. Here, by considering a population of individuals who play a public goods game, followed by a public punishing game, introduced here, we show that altruistic punishment indeed evolves and promotes cooperation in the absence of a cooperation-favoring mechanism. In our model, the punishment pool is considered a public resource whose resources are used for punishment. We show that the evolution of a punishing institution is facilitated when resources in the punishment pool, instead of being wasted, are used to reward punishers when there is nobody to punish. Besides, we show that higher returns to the public resource or punishment pool facilitate the evolution of prosocial instead of antisocial punishment. We also show that an optimal cost of investment in the punishment pool facilitates the evolution of prosocial punishment. Finally, our analysis shows that being close to a physical phase transition facilitates the evolution of altruistic punishment.Mohammad SalahshourPublic Library of Science (PLoS)articleMedicineRScienceQENPLoS ONE, Vol 16, Iss 8, p e0254860 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Mohammad Salahshour Evolution of prosocial punishment in unstructured and structured populations and in the presence of antisocial punishment.
description	A large body of empirical evidence suggests that altruistic punishment abounds in human societies. Based on such evidence, it is suggested that punishment serves an important role in promoting cooperation in humans and possibly other species. However, as punishment is costly, its evolution is subject to the same problem that it tries to address. To suppress this so-called second-order free-rider problem, known theoretical models on the evolution of punishment resort to one of the few established mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation. This leaves the question of whether altruistic punishment can evolve and give rise to the evolution of cooperation in the absence of such auxiliary cooperation-favoring mechanisms unaddressed. Here, by considering a population of individuals who play a public goods game, followed by a public punishing game, introduced here, we show that altruistic punishment indeed evolves and promotes cooperation in the absence of a cooperation-favoring mechanism. In our model, the punishment pool is considered a public resource whose resources are used for punishment. We show that the evolution of a punishing institution is facilitated when resources in the punishment pool, instead of being wasted, are used to reward punishers when there is nobody to punish. Besides, we show that higher returns to the public resource or punishment pool facilitate the evolution of prosocial instead of antisocial punishment. We also show that an optimal cost of investment in the punishment pool facilitates the evolution of prosocial punishment. Finally, our analysis shows that being close to a physical phase transition facilitates the evolution of altruistic punishment.
format	article
author	Mohammad Salahshour
author_facet	Mohammad Salahshour
author_sort	Mohammad Salahshour
title	Evolution of prosocial punishment in unstructured and structured populations and in the presence of antisocial punishment.
title_short	Evolution of prosocial punishment in unstructured and structured populations and in the presence of antisocial punishment.
title_full	Evolution of prosocial punishment in unstructured and structured populations and in the presence of antisocial punishment.
title_fullStr	Evolution of prosocial punishment in unstructured and structured populations and in the presence of antisocial punishment.
title_full_unstemmed	Evolution of prosocial punishment in unstructured and structured populations and in the presence of antisocial punishment.
title_sort	evolution of prosocial punishment in unstructured and structured populations and in the presence of antisocial punishment.
publisher	Public Library of Science (PLoS)
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/b59d28618fd84fdc96084a6f0ff0de35
work_keys_str_mv	AT mohammadsalahshour evolutionofprosocialpunishmentinunstructuredandstructuredpopulationsandinthepresenceofantisocialpunishment
_version_	1718374306320220160

Evolution of prosocial punishment in unstructured and structured populations and in the presence of antisocial punishment.

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