Monitoring and evaluating the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+: the case of India’s ecological fiscal transfers
Introduction: The central premise underlying international payments for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) is that offering governments ex post payments for verified success in reducing emissions will motivate them to protect and restore forests. However, the extent...
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oai:doaj.org-article:b6bfc969aafb49178fdb5a7bed57da342021-12-02T13:26:52ZMonitoring and evaluating the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+: the case of India’s ecological fiscal transfers2096-41292332-887810.1080/20964129.2018.1492335https://doaj.org/article/b6bfc969aafb49178fdb5a7bed57da342018-07-01T00:00:00Zhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20964129.2018.1492335https://doaj.org/toc/2096-4129https://doaj.org/toc/2332-8878Introduction: The central premise underlying international payments for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) is that offering governments ex post payments for verified success in reducing emissions will motivate them to protect and restore forests. However, the extent to which performance-based payments motivate governments to protect and restore forests has yet to be evaluated quantitatively. Researchers have only quantitatively evaluated performance-based payments to non-governments for forest outcomes (e.g. payments for ecosystem services) and to governments for non-forest outcomes (e.g. results-based aid). Methods: We describe how researchers now have an opportunity to more easily evaluate performance-based payments to governments for forest outcomes thanks to India’s new ecological fiscal transfers (EFTs), which provide $6-12 billion per year to Indian states in proportion to their forest cover. Discussion: India’s EFTs differ from REDD+ programs in that they pay for states’ stock of forest area in the recent past rather than reductions in the rate of forest carbon loss in the near-future. Nevertheless, India’s EFTs focus on a single outcome and have many recipient governments, significant financial scale, lack of contemporaneous confounding policy changes, universal participation, and long-term data collection. Conclusion: These features make India’s EFTs especially useful for testing the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+.Jonah BuschTaylor & Francis GrouparticleEcological fiscal transfersIndiamonitoring and evaluationpayment-for-performanceREDD+EcologyQH540-549.5ENEcosystem Health and Sustainability, Vol 4, Iss 7, Pp 169-175 (2018) |
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Ecological fiscal transfers India monitoring and evaluation payment-for-performance REDD+ Ecology QH540-549.5 |
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Ecological fiscal transfers India monitoring and evaluation payment-for-performance REDD+ Ecology QH540-549.5 Jonah Busch Monitoring and evaluating the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+: the case of India’s ecological fiscal transfers |
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Introduction: The central premise underlying international payments for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) is that offering governments ex post payments for verified success in reducing emissions will motivate them to protect and restore forests. However, the extent to which performance-based payments motivate governments to protect and restore forests has yet to be evaluated quantitatively. Researchers have only quantitatively evaluated performance-based payments to non-governments for forest outcomes (e.g. payments for ecosystem services) and to governments for non-forest outcomes (e.g. results-based aid). Methods: We describe how researchers now have an opportunity to more easily evaluate performance-based payments to governments for forest outcomes thanks to India’s new ecological fiscal transfers (EFTs), which provide $6-12 billion per year to Indian states in proportion to their forest cover. Discussion: India’s EFTs differ from REDD+ programs in that they pay for states’ stock of forest area in the recent past rather than reductions in the rate of forest carbon loss in the near-future. Nevertheless, India’s EFTs focus on a single outcome and have many recipient governments, significant financial scale, lack of contemporaneous confounding policy changes, universal participation, and long-term data collection. Conclusion: These features make India’s EFTs especially useful for testing the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+. |
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Jonah Busch |
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Jonah Busch |
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Jonah Busch |
title |
Monitoring and evaluating the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+: the case of India’s ecological fiscal transfers |
title_short |
Monitoring and evaluating the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+: the case of India’s ecological fiscal transfers |
title_full |
Monitoring and evaluating the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+: the case of India’s ecological fiscal transfers |
title_fullStr |
Monitoring and evaluating the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+: the case of India’s ecological fiscal transfers |
title_full_unstemmed |
Monitoring and evaluating the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+: the case of India’s ecological fiscal transfers |
title_sort |
monitoring and evaluating the payment-for-performance premise of redd+: the case of india’s ecological fiscal transfers |
publisher |
Taylor & Francis Group |
publishDate |
2018 |
url |
https://doaj.org/article/b6bfc969aafb49178fdb5a7bed57da34 |
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AT jonahbusch monitoringandevaluatingthepaymentforperformancepremiseofreddthecaseofindiasecologicalfiscaltransfers |
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1718393053990879232 |