Monitoring and evaluating the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+: the case of India’s ecological fiscal transfers

Introduction: The central premise underlying international payments for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) is that offering governments ex post payments for verified success in reducing emissions will motivate them to protect and restore forests. However, the extent...

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Autor principal: Jonah Busch
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Publicado: Taylor & Francis Group 2018
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:b6bfc969aafb49178fdb5a7bed57da342021-12-02T13:26:52ZMonitoring and evaluating the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+: the case of India’s ecological fiscal transfers2096-41292332-887810.1080/20964129.2018.1492335https://doaj.org/article/b6bfc969aafb49178fdb5a7bed57da342018-07-01T00:00:00Zhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20964129.2018.1492335https://doaj.org/toc/2096-4129https://doaj.org/toc/2332-8878Introduction: The central premise underlying international payments for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) is that offering governments ex post payments for verified success in reducing emissions will motivate them to protect and restore forests. However, the extent to which performance-based payments motivate governments to protect and restore forests has yet to be evaluated quantitatively. Researchers have only quantitatively evaluated performance-based payments to non-governments for forest outcomes (e.g. payments for ecosystem services) and to governments for non-forest outcomes (e.g. results-based aid). Methods: We describe how researchers now have an opportunity to more easily evaluate performance-based payments to governments for forest outcomes thanks to India’s new ecological fiscal transfers (EFTs), which provide $6-12 billion per year to Indian states in proportion to their forest cover. Discussion: India’s EFTs differ from REDD+ programs in that they pay for states’ stock of forest area in the recent past rather than reductions in the rate of forest carbon loss in the near-future. Nevertheless, India’s EFTs focus on a single outcome and have many recipient governments, significant financial scale, lack of contemporaneous confounding policy changes, universal participation, and long-term data collection. Conclusion: These features make India’s EFTs especially useful for testing the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+.Jonah BuschTaylor & Francis GrouparticleEcological fiscal transfersIndiamonitoring and evaluationpayment-for-performanceREDD+EcologyQH540-549.5ENEcosystem Health and Sustainability, Vol 4, Iss 7, Pp 169-175 (2018)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
topic Ecological fiscal transfers
India
monitoring and evaluation
payment-for-performance
REDD+
Ecology
QH540-549.5
spellingShingle Ecological fiscal transfers
India
monitoring and evaluation
payment-for-performance
REDD+
Ecology
QH540-549.5
Jonah Busch
Monitoring and evaluating the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+: the case of India’s ecological fiscal transfers
description Introduction: The central premise underlying international payments for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) is that offering governments ex post payments for verified success in reducing emissions will motivate them to protect and restore forests. However, the extent to which performance-based payments motivate governments to protect and restore forests has yet to be evaluated quantitatively. Researchers have only quantitatively evaluated performance-based payments to non-governments for forest outcomes (e.g. payments for ecosystem services) and to governments for non-forest outcomes (e.g. results-based aid). Methods: We describe how researchers now have an opportunity to more easily evaluate performance-based payments to governments for forest outcomes thanks to India’s new ecological fiscal transfers (EFTs), which provide $6-12 billion per year to Indian states in proportion to their forest cover. Discussion: India’s EFTs differ from REDD+ programs in that they pay for states’ stock of forest area in the recent past rather than reductions in the rate of forest carbon loss in the near-future. Nevertheless, India’s EFTs focus on a single outcome and have many recipient governments, significant financial scale, lack of contemporaneous confounding policy changes, universal participation, and long-term data collection. Conclusion: These features make India’s EFTs especially useful for testing the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+.
format article
author Jonah Busch
author_facet Jonah Busch
author_sort Jonah Busch
title Monitoring and evaluating the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+: the case of India’s ecological fiscal transfers
title_short Monitoring and evaluating the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+: the case of India’s ecological fiscal transfers
title_full Monitoring and evaluating the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+: the case of India’s ecological fiscal transfers
title_fullStr Monitoring and evaluating the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+: the case of India’s ecological fiscal transfers
title_full_unstemmed Monitoring and evaluating the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+: the case of India’s ecological fiscal transfers
title_sort monitoring and evaluating the payment-for-performance premise of redd+: the case of india’s ecological fiscal transfers
publisher Taylor & Francis Group
publishDate 2018
url https://doaj.org/article/b6bfc969aafb49178fdb5a7bed57da34
work_keys_str_mv AT jonahbusch monitoringandevaluatingthepaymentforperformancepremiseofreddthecaseofindiasecologicalfiscaltransfers
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