Globalization, State, Identity/Difference
What is reality? Is reality what we see? How do we tell what is real, and how do we differentiate “real” from “false” or uncover the truth in an objective fashion? The search for reality or understanding the dynamics of human interaction in an institutionalized setting has resulted in a vibrant deb...
Guardado en:
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | EN |
| Publicado: |
International Institute of Islamic Thought
1998
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/b936fae8d99f4433ad718ee5d1cca455 |
| Etiquetas: |
Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
|
| Sumario: | What is reality? Is reality what we see? How do we tell what is real, and how do we
differentiate “real” from “false” or uncover the truth in an objective fashion? The search
for reality or understanding the dynamics of human interaction in an institutionalized setting
has resulted in a vibrant debate in international relations (IR) theory over the metatheoretical
foundations of knowledge production. Positivists and realists claim that truth and
reality can be and have been uncovered by thorough and patient research. Truth is, after all,
“out there” somewhere in the real world, and it is the task of social scientists to uncover it.
Critical social theorists, however, argue that social science is not akin to physical or even
natural sciences, for human behavior is dynamic and varies both spatially and temporally.
“Reality” or “truth” can never be discovered or known completely because of the nature of
social activity. Furthermore, there are no fixed foundations for judging what is “real,”
“true,” or “false.” Hence, the attention of critical social inquiry has focused predominantly
on the epistemological and ontological foundations of social scientific methods.
By concentrating on epistemology and ontology, critical social theorists have shown
the structural weakness of positivist and realist theories. Furthermore, the inability of positive
social science to go beyond surface structures to explore deep structures of knowledge
also has been exposed by critical social theorists. The unequivocal outcome of critical social
theory is that knowledge, interest, and preference matter and, therefore, cannot be assumed.
The critical social theorist does not focus on the cognitive manifestations of knowledge,
interests, and preferences, but rather on how they are formed, created, or constructed.
However, despite its ombudsman-like value and importance, critical social theory
has yet to emerge as an effective alternative to positive social science. Critical social theory
has remained true to its name and has continued to play the role of a harsh but valuable
critic. Keyman seeks to buck this trend by providing a basis for using critical social
theory not just as an epistemological critique to challenge the extant theoretical hegemony,
but also to deploy it as a “first-order theorizing tool”-an ambitious goal indeed. His
book is an attempt to bridge the theory-metatheory gap found in IR theory and, at the same
time, elevate critical social theory to the level of such first-order theories as the much
maligned Waltzian theory of international relations. The challenge of deploying critical
social theory not just as a captious force, but rather as a constructive theory, is a difficult
and slippery task. Critical social theory should be able to criticize and dismantle without
relying on foundational support (i.e., without relying on positivistic moments). In addition,
it also should resist succumbing to the temptation of assuming the discourse of the
hegemon, in which the “other” becomes the subject.
Keyman attempts to traverse these intellectual minefields by emphasizing the need for
dialogical interaction between discourse (object) and subject. The object and subject should ...
|
|---|