Phenomenological Habitus and Social Creativity

How is social creativity linked to habitual dispositions? This paper critiques Bourdieu’s answer to this question, which is related to his theory of habitus, against the background of its phenomenological evidences. His concept of habitual dispositions seems to be linked both to an internalisation...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal:	Valérie Kokoszka
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
Materias:	habit types Bourdieu creativity Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/b943aec1a656470496906de2fac59ae5
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

id	oai:doaj.org-article:b943aec1a656470496906de2fac59ae5
record_format	dspace
spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:b943aec1a656470496906de2fac59ae52021-12-02T10:30:26ZPhenomenological Habitus and Social Creativity10.13128/Phe_Mi-195592280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/b943aec1a656470496906de2fac59ae52016-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7153https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 How is social creativity linked to habitual dispositions? This paper critiques Bourdieu’s answer to this question, which is related to his theory of habitus, against the background of its phenomenological evidences. His concept of habitual dispositions seems to be linked both to an internalisation of the performativity of habits as a form of Kantian schematism (in Husserlian terms: ‘noetization’), and to a static concept of the social environment, which is never analysed in its own dynamic structural relation to the life of the bearer of habits. Through the genetic-phenomenological distinction between habits as noetic dispositions and types as noematic schemes, the paper seeks to show that the social environment cannot be presupposed as a given field of social objectivities and norms that are stabilized by internalized habitual dispositions, but should instead be seen as an enactively framed habitat. When we further distinguish between passive and active habitualities, their intertwining comes to the fore, showing how in taking a position in relation to its own cultural environment the subject finds in the hiatus between disposition and the disposed leeway for a relative framework of spontaneity and personal cultivation, a space allowing for individual and, ultimately, social creativity that is absent from Bourdieu’s account. Valérie KokoszkaRosenberg & SellierarticlehabittypesBourdieucreativityAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 6 (2016)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	habit types Bourdieu creativity Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	habit types Bourdieu creativity Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Valérie Kokoszka Phenomenological Habitus and Social Creativity
description	How is social creativity linked to habitual dispositions? This paper critiques Bourdieu’s answer to this question, which is related to his theory of habitus, against the background of its phenomenological evidences. His concept of habitual dispositions seems to be linked both to an internalisation of the performativity of habits as a form of Kantian schematism (in Husserlian terms: ‘noetization’), and to a static concept of the social environment, which is never analysed in its own dynamic structural relation to the life of the bearer of habits. Through the genetic-phenomenological distinction between habits as noetic dispositions and types as noematic schemes, the paper seeks to show that the social environment cannot be presupposed as a given field of social objectivities and norms that are stabilized by internalized habitual dispositions, but should instead be seen as an enactively framed habitat. When we further distinguish between passive and active habitualities, their intertwining comes to the fore, showing how in taking a position in relation to its own cultural environment the subject finds in the hiatus between disposition and the disposed leeway for a relative framework of spontaneity and personal cultivation, a space allowing for individual and, ultimately, social creativity that is absent from Bourdieu’s account.
format	article
author	Valérie Kokoszka
author_facet	Valérie Kokoszka
author_sort	Valérie Kokoszka
title	Phenomenological Habitus and Social Creativity
title_short	Phenomenological Habitus and Social Creativity
title_full	Phenomenological Habitus and Social Creativity
title_fullStr	Phenomenological Habitus and Social Creativity
title_full_unstemmed	Phenomenological Habitus and Social Creativity
title_sort	phenomenological habitus and social creativity
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2016
url	https://doaj.org/article/b943aec1a656470496906de2fac59ae5
work_keys_str_mv	AT valeriekokoszka phenomenologicalhabitusandsocialcreativity
_version_	1718397138636898304

Phenomenological Habitus and Social Creativity

Ejemplares similares