An optimal strategy to solve the Prisoner’s Dilemma

Abstract Cooperation is a central mechanism for evolution. It consists of an individual paying a cost in order to benefit another individual. However, natural selection describes individuals as being selfish and in competition among themselves. Therefore explaining the origin of cooperation within t...

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Autores principales:	Alessandro Bravetti, Pablo Padilla
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2018
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/bdea6377a8ad49feae0dd938ac5435eb
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:bdea6377a8ad49feae0dd938ac5435eb2021-12-02T15:08:39ZAn optimal strategy to solve the Prisoner’s Dilemma10.1038/s41598-018-20426-w2045-2322https://doaj.org/article/bdea6377a8ad49feae0dd938ac5435eb2018-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-018-20426-whttps://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract Cooperation is a central mechanism for evolution. It consists of an individual paying a cost in order to benefit another individual. However, natural selection describes individuals as being selfish and in competition among themselves. Therefore explaining the origin of cooperation within the context of natural selection is a problem that has been puzzling researchers for a long time. In the paradigmatic case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), several schemes for the evolution of cooperation have been proposed. Here we introduce an extension of the Replicator Equation (RE), called the Optimal Replicator Equation (ORE), motivated by the fact that evolution acts not only at the level of individuals of a population, but also among competing populations, and we show that this new model for natural selection directly leads to a simple and natural rule for the emergence of cooperation in the most basic version of the PD. Contrary to common belief, our results reveal that cooperation can emerge among selfish individuals because of selfishness itself: if the final reward for being part of a society is sufficiently appealing, players spontaneously decide to cooperate.Alessandro BravettiPablo PadillaNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 8, Iss 1, Pp 1-6 (2018)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Alessandro Bravetti Pablo Padilla An optimal strategy to solve the Prisoner’s Dilemma
description	Abstract Cooperation is a central mechanism for evolution. It consists of an individual paying a cost in order to benefit another individual. However, natural selection describes individuals as being selfish and in competition among themselves. Therefore explaining the origin of cooperation within the context of natural selection is a problem that has been puzzling researchers for a long time. In the paradigmatic case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), several schemes for the evolution of cooperation have been proposed. Here we introduce an extension of the Replicator Equation (RE), called the Optimal Replicator Equation (ORE), motivated by the fact that evolution acts not only at the level of individuals of a population, but also among competing populations, and we show that this new model for natural selection directly leads to a simple and natural rule for the emergence of cooperation in the most basic version of the PD. Contrary to common belief, our results reveal that cooperation can emerge among selfish individuals because of selfishness itself: if the final reward for being part of a society is sufficiently appealing, players spontaneously decide to cooperate.
format	article
author	Alessandro Bravetti Pablo Padilla
author_facet	Alessandro Bravetti Pablo Padilla
author_sort	Alessandro Bravetti
title	An optimal strategy to solve the Prisoner’s Dilemma
title_short	An optimal strategy to solve the Prisoner’s Dilemma
title_full	An optimal strategy to solve the Prisoner’s Dilemma
title_fullStr	An optimal strategy to solve the Prisoner’s Dilemma
title_full_unstemmed	An optimal strategy to solve the Prisoner’s Dilemma
title_sort	optimal strategy to solve the prisoner’s dilemma
publisher	Nature Portfolio
publishDate	2018
url	https://doaj.org/article/bdea6377a8ad49feae0dd938ac5435eb
work_keys_str_mv	AT alessandrobravetti anoptimalstrategytosolvetheprisonersdilemma AT pablopadilla anoptimalstrategytosolvetheprisonersdilemma AT alessandrobravetti optimalstrategytosolvetheprisonersdilemma AT pablopadilla optimalstrategytosolvetheprisonersdilemma
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An optimal strategy to solve the Prisoner’s Dilemma

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