Kant’s Metaphilosophy
While the term “metaphilosophy” enjoys increasing popularity in Kant scholarship, it is neither clear what distinguishes a metaphilosophical theory from a philosophical one nor to what extent Kant’s philosophy contains metaphilosophical views. In the first part of the article, I will introduce a dem...
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De Gruyter
2021
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oai:doaj.org-article:bee96b53ac054903abfa80944ee373b22021-12-05T14:11:01ZKant’s Metaphilosophy2543-887510.1515/opphil-2020-0190https://doaj.org/article/bee96b53ac054903abfa80944ee373b22021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2020-0190https://doaj.org/toc/2543-8875While the term “metaphilosophy” enjoys increasing popularity in Kant scholarship, it is neither clear what distinguishes a metaphilosophical theory from a philosophical one nor to what extent Kant’s philosophy contains metaphilosophical views. In the first part of the article, I will introduce a demarcation criterion and show how scholars fall prey to the fallacy of extension confusing Kant’s philosophical theories with his theories about philosophy. In the second part, I will analyze eight elements for an “imperfect definition” (KrV A731/B759) of philosophy outlining the scope of Kant’s explicit metaphilosophy against the backdrop of recent metaphilosophical research: (i) scientific concept of philosophy, (ii) philosophy as an activity, (iii) worldly concept, (iv) philosophy as a (proper and improper) science, (v) philosophy as an architectonic idea (archetype and ectypes), (vi) philosophy as a social practice and the appropriate holding-to-be-true (one or many true philosophies?), (vii) reason as the absolute condition and subject of philosophy, and (viii) methodology of philosophy. I will put these elements together for an attempt to give an imperfect definition of philosophy – something that Kant promised but never did – in the conclusion.Lewin MichaelDe Gruyterarticlephilosophy of philosophymetaphilosophical discoursedefinition of philosophyidea of philosophyends of philosophyphilosophy as a sciencemethodology of philosophytranscendental philosophyempirical philosophyarchitectonicsPhilosophy (General)B1-5802ENOpen Philosophy, Vol 4, Iss 1, Pp 292-310 (2021) |
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DOAJ |
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philosophy of philosophy metaphilosophical discourse definition of philosophy idea of philosophy ends of philosophy philosophy as a science methodology of philosophy transcendental philosophy empirical philosophy architectonics Philosophy (General) B1-5802 |
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philosophy of philosophy metaphilosophical discourse definition of philosophy idea of philosophy ends of philosophy philosophy as a science methodology of philosophy transcendental philosophy empirical philosophy architectonics Philosophy (General) B1-5802 Lewin Michael Kant’s Metaphilosophy |
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While the term “metaphilosophy” enjoys increasing popularity in Kant scholarship, it is neither clear what distinguishes a metaphilosophical theory from a philosophical one nor to what extent Kant’s philosophy contains metaphilosophical views. In the first part of the article, I will introduce a demarcation criterion and show how scholars fall prey to the fallacy of extension confusing Kant’s philosophical theories with his theories about philosophy. In the second part, I will analyze eight elements for an “imperfect definition” (KrV A731/B759) of philosophy outlining the scope of Kant’s explicit metaphilosophy against the backdrop of recent metaphilosophical research: (i) scientific concept of philosophy, (ii) philosophy as an activity, (iii) worldly concept, (iv) philosophy as a (proper and improper) science, (v) philosophy as an architectonic idea (archetype and ectypes), (vi) philosophy as a social practice and the appropriate holding-to-be-true (one or many true philosophies?), (vii) reason as the absolute condition and subject of philosophy, and (viii) methodology of philosophy. I will put these elements together for an attempt to give an imperfect definition of philosophy – something that Kant promised but never did – in the conclusion. |
| format |
article |
| author |
Lewin Michael |
| author_facet |
Lewin Michael |
| author_sort |
Lewin Michael |
| title |
Kant’s Metaphilosophy |
| title_short |
Kant’s Metaphilosophy |
| title_full |
Kant’s Metaphilosophy |
| title_fullStr |
Kant’s Metaphilosophy |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Kant’s Metaphilosophy |
| title_sort |
kant’s metaphilosophy |
| publisher |
De Gruyter |
| publishDate |
2021 |
| url |
https://doaj.org/article/bee96b53ac054903abfa80944ee373b2 |
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AT lewinmichael kantsmetaphilosophy |
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