Types of Consciousness: The Diversity Problem

Consciousness research has a cognitive-diversity problem. Any view that holds that attention is either necessary for consciousness or that attention precedes conscious awareness confronts the difficulty that the theoretical categorization of attention is as diverse as the categorization of intellige...

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Autor principal:	Carlos Montemayor
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Frontiers Media S.A. 2021
Materias:	consciousness attention language consciousness and agency consciousness and attention Neurosciences. Biological psychiatry. Neuropsychiatry RC321-571
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/bf38f040175f47919d4233fee2a32d0b
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:bf38f040175f47919d4233fee2a32d0b2021-11-30T09:58:57ZTypes of Consciousness: The Diversity Problem1662-513710.3389/fnsys.2021.747797https://doaj.org/article/bf38f040175f47919d4233fee2a32d0b2021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fnsys.2021.747797/fullhttps://doaj.org/toc/1662-5137Consciousness research has a cognitive-diversity problem. Any view that holds that attention is either necessary for consciousness or that attention precedes conscious awareness confronts the difficulty that the theoretical categorization of attention is as diverse as the categorization of intelligent cognition, but consciousness is typically referred to as a single and unified capacity. On the one hand, we have a multiplicity of kinds of attention. On the other hand, we use a monolithic “phenomenal” notion of consciousness to define the dependency of consciousness on all these diverse kinds of attention. Since attention is defined in terms of a diverse variety of functions, a lot more needs to be said with respect to the claim that attention is either necessary for consciousness or that attentional processing precedes conscious awareness. Is this dependency based on the diverse cognitive functions of attention? If so, why conceive of consciousness as a single informationally unified cognitive capacity? What does the multiplicity of kinds of attention entail for consciousness research? This is the “diversity problem.” This article argues that consciousness should be also considered as a diverse set of capacities, based on the diversity of attention. While we have the intuition that consciousness is a unified perspective, the article shows that consistency demands this diverse approach. Since research on attention distinguishes a wide range of functions and levels of cognitive processing, the dependency of consciousness on attention entails diverse conscious capacities and diverse types of awareness beyond the distinctions between being awake, dreaming, and being minimally conscious.Carlos MontemayorFrontiers Media S.A.articleconsciousnessattentionlanguageconsciousness and agencyconsciousness and attentionNeurosciences. Biological psychiatry. NeuropsychiatryRC321-571ENFrontiers in Systems Neuroscience, Vol 15 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	consciousness attention language consciousness and agency consciousness and attention Neurosciences. Biological psychiatry. Neuropsychiatry RC321-571
spellingShingle	consciousness attention language consciousness and agency consciousness and attention Neurosciences. Biological psychiatry. Neuropsychiatry RC321-571 Carlos Montemayor Types of Consciousness: The Diversity Problem
description	Consciousness research has a cognitive-diversity problem. Any view that holds that attention is either necessary for consciousness or that attention precedes conscious awareness confronts the difficulty that the theoretical categorization of attention is as diverse as the categorization of intelligent cognition, but consciousness is typically referred to as a single and unified capacity. On the one hand, we have a multiplicity of kinds of attention. On the other hand, we use a monolithic “phenomenal” notion of consciousness to define the dependency of consciousness on all these diverse kinds of attention. Since attention is defined in terms of a diverse variety of functions, a lot more needs to be said with respect to the claim that attention is either necessary for consciousness or that attentional processing precedes conscious awareness. Is this dependency based on the diverse cognitive functions of attention? If so, why conceive of consciousness as a single informationally unified cognitive capacity? What does the multiplicity of kinds of attention entail for consciousness research? This is the “diversity problem.” This article argues that consciousness should be also considered as a diverse set of capacities, based on the diversity of attention. While we have the intuition that consciousness is a unified perspective, the article shows that consistency demands this diverse approach. Since research on attention distinguishes a wide range of functions and levels of cognitive processing, the dependency of consciousness on attention entails diverse conscious capacities and diverse types of awareness beyond the distinctions between being awake, dreaming, and being minimally conscious.
format	article
author	Carlos Montemayor
author_facet	Carlos Montemayor
author_sort	Carlos Montemayor
title	Types of Consciousness: The Diversity Problem
title_short	Types of Consciousness: The Diversity Problem
title_full	Types of Consciousness: The Diversity Problem
title_fullStr	Types of Consciousness: The Diversity Problem
title_full_unstemmed	Types of Consciousness: The Diversity Problem
title_sort	types of consciousness: the diversity problem
publisher	Frontiers Media S.A.
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/bf38f040175f47919d4233fee2a32d0b
work_keys_str_mv	AT carlosmontemayor typesofconsciousnessthediversityproblem
_version_	1718406707109953536

Types of Consciousness: The Diversity Problem

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