Faultless Disagreement Contextualism

It is widely assumed that the possibility of faultless disagreement is to be explained by the peculiar semantics and/or pragmatics of special kinds of linguistic construction. For instance, if A asserts “o is F” and B asserts this sentence’s denial, A and B can disagree faultlessly only if they empl...

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Autor principal: Alex Davies
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Lenguaje:CS
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SK
Publicado: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences 2021
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Acceso en línea:https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28304
https://doaj.org/article/bfef994a011446ba98892d31305814cf
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:bfef994a011446ba98892d31305814cf2021-11-30T16:17:38ZFaultless Disagreement Contextualismhttps://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.283041335-06682585-7150https://doaj.org/article/bfef994a011446ba98892d31305814cf2021-08-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/09211016orgf.2021.28304.pdfhttps://doaj.org/toc/1335-0668https://doaj.org/toc/2585-7150It is widely assumed that the possibility of faultless disagreement is to be explained by the peculiar semantics and/or pragmatics of special kinds of linguistic construction. For instance, if A asserts “o is F” and B asserts this sentence’s denial, A and B can disagree faultlessly only if they employ the right kind of predicate as their “F”. In this paper, I present an argument against this assumption. Focusing on the special case when the expression of interest is a predicate, I present a series of examples in which the same pairs of sentences are employed, but in different contexts. In some cases, we get an impression of faultless disagreement and in some cases we don’t. I identify a pattern across these contexts and conclude that faultless disagreement is made possible, not by a special kind of predicate, but instead by a special kind of context.Alex DaviesInstitute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciencesarticledisagreementfaultless disagreementinstrumental reasonsobjectivityPhilosophy (General)B1-5802CSENSKOrganon F, Vol 28, Iss 3, Pp 557-580 (2021)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language CS
EN
SK
topic disagreement
faultless disagreement
instrumental reasons
objectivity
Philosophy (General)
B1-5802
spellingShingle disagreement
faultless disagreement
instrumental reasons
objectivity
Philosophy (General)
B1-5802
Alex Davies
Faultless Disagreement Contextualism
description It is widely assumed that the possibility of faultless disagreement is to be explained by the peculiar semantics and/or pragmatics of special kinds of linguistic construction. For instance, if A asserts “o is F” and B asserts this sentence’s denial, A and B can disagree faultlessly only if they employ the right kind of predicate as their “F”. In this paper, I present an argument against this assumption. Focusing on the special case when the expression of interest is a predicate, I present a series of examples in which the same pairs of sentences are employed, but in different contexts. In some cases, we get an impression of faultless disagreement and in some cases we don’t. I identify a pattern across these contexts and conclude that faultless disagreement is made possible, not by a special kind of predicate, but instead by a special kind of context.
format article
author Alex Davies
author_facet Alex Davies
author_sort Alex Davies
title Faultless Disagreement Contextualism
title_short Faultless Disagreement Contextualism
title_full Faultless Disagreement Contextualism
title_fullStr Faultless Disagreement Contextualism
title_full_unstemmed Faultless Disagreement Contextualism
title_sort faultless disagreement contextualism
publisher Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
publishDate 2021
url https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28304
https://doaj.org/article/bfef994a011446ba98892d31305814cf
work_keys_str_mv AT alexdavies faultlessdisagreementcontextualism
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