Investor use of revised analyst information following management disclosures

This study investigates the use of revised analyst forecast information that is released following management disclosures. I extend the prior literature by examining the relationship between the contents of analyst forecast revisions and the content of management disclosures. I provide evidence that...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal:	Kyunbeom Jeong
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Taylor & Francis Group 2020
Materias:	analyst forecast revision management disclosure investor reaction timing sequence of information Business HF5001-6182 Management. Industrial management HD28-70
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/c11fc3693a974f738ee354aab788c3c7
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

id	oai:doaj.org-article:c11fc3693a974f738ee354aab788c3c7
record_format	dspace
spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:c11fc3693a974f738ee354aab788c3c72021-12-02T15:59:46ZInvestor use of revised analyst information following management disclosures2331-197510.1080/23311975.2020.1757843https://doaj.org/article/c11fc3693a974f738ee354aab788c3c72020-01-01T00:00:00Zhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2020.1757843https://doaj.org/toc/2331-1975This study investigates the use of revised analyst forecast information that is released following management disclosures. I extend the prior literature by examining the relationship between the contents of analyst forecast revisions and the content of management disclosures. I provide evidence that investor reaction is greater in response to analyst revisions that are consistent with prior management disclosures. I also find that the amount of new information is greater in the analyst revisions that are inconsistent with management disclosures, which suggests that the inconsistency of analyst information is a result of the new information. Additionally, I find that the new information causes a more significant effect if the analyst revisions are historically more accurate than the management forecasts. These results suggest that investors consider not only the timing sequence of analyst information with respect to the corporate disclosures, but also the relationship between the analyst information and the corporate disclosure in their use of revised analyst information.Kyunbeom JeongTaylor & Francis Grouparticleanalyst forecast revisionmanagement disclosureinvestor reactiontiming sequence of informationBusinessHF5001-6182Management. Industrial managementHD28-70ENCogent Business & Management, Vol 7, Iss 1 (2020)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	analyst forecast revision management disclosure investor reaction timing sequence of information Business HF5001-6182 Management. Industrial management HD28-70
spellingShingle	analyst forecast revision management disclosure investor reaction timing sequence of information Business HF5001-6182 Management. Industrial management HD28-70 Kyunbeom Jeong Investor use of revised analyst information following management disclosures
description	This study investigates the use of revised analyst forecast information that is released following management disclosures. I extend the prior literature by examining the relationship between the contents of analyst forecast revisions and the content of management disclosures. I provide evidence that investor reaction is greater in response to analyst revisions that are consistent with prior management disclosures. I also find that the amount of new information is greater in the analyst revisions that are inconsistent with management disclosures, which suggests that the inconsistency of analyst information is a result of the new information. Additionally, I find that the new information causes a more significant effect if the analyst revisions are historically more accurate than the management forecasts. These results suggest that investors consider not only the timing sequence of analyst information with respect to the corporate disclosures, but also the relationship between the analyst information and the corporate disclosure in their use of revised analyst information.
format	article
author	Kyunbeom Jeong
author_facet	Kyunbeom Jeong
author_sort	Kyunbeom Jeong
title	Investor use of revised analyst information following management disclosures
title_short	Investor use of revised analyst information following management disclosures
title_full	Investor use of revised analyst information following management disclosures
title_fullStr	Investor use of revised analyst information following management disclosures
title_full_unstemmed	Investor use of revised analyst information following management disclosures
title_sort	investor use of revised analyst information following management disclosures
publisher	Taylor & Francis Group
publishDate	2020
url	https://doaj.org/article/c11fc3693a974f738ee354aab788c3c7
work_keys_str_mv	AT kyunbeomjeong investoruseofrevisedanalystinformationfollowingmanagementdisclosures
_version_	1718385353942892544

Investor use of revised analyst information following management disclosures

Ejemplares similares