Empathy emerges spontaneously in the ultimatum game: small groups and networks.

The Ultimatum game, in which one subject proposes how to share a pot and the other has veto power on the proposal, in which case both lose everything, is a paradigmatic scenario to probe the degree of cooperation and altruism in human subjects. It has been shown that if individuals are empathic, i.e...

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Autores principales:	Jaime Iranzo, Luis M Floría, Yamir Moreno, Angel Sánchez
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2012
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/c6705652522a43a3b42647001c618cb3
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:c6705652522a43a3b42647001c618cb32021-11-18T08:13:58ZEmpathy emerges spontaneously in the ultimatum game: small groups and networks.1932-620310.1371/journal.pone.0043781https://doaj.org/article/c6705652522a43a3b42647001c618cb32012-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/pmid/23049740/?tool=EBIhttps://doaj.org/toc/1932-6203The Ultimatum game, in which one subject proposes how to share a pot and the other has veto power on the proposal, in which case both lose everything, is a paradigmatic scenario to probe the degree of cooperation and altruism in human subjects. It has been shown that if individuals are empathic, i.e., they play the game having in mind how their opponent will react by offering an amount that they themselves would accept, then non-rational large offers well above the smallest possible ones are evolutionarily selected. We here show that empathy itself may be selected and need not be exogenously imposed provided that interactions take place only with a fraction of the total population, and that the role of proposer or responder is randomly changed from round to round. These empathic agents, that displace agents with independent (uncorrelated) offers and proposals, behave far from what is expected rationally, offering and accepting sizable fractions of the amount to be shared. Specific values for the typical offer depend on the details of the interacion network and on the existence of hubs, but they are almost always significantly larger than zero, indicating that the mechanism at work here is quite general and could explain the emergence of empathy in very many different contexts.Jaime IranzoLuis M FloríaYamir MorenoAngel SánchezPublic Library of Science (PLoS)articleMedicineRScienceQENPLoS ONE, Vol 7, Iss 9, p e43781 (2012)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Jaime Iranzo Luis M Floría Yamir Moreno Angel Sánchez Empathy emerges spontaneously in the ultimatum game: small groups and networks.
description	The Ultimatum game, in which one subject proposes how to share a pot and the other has veto power on the proposal, in which case both lose everything, is a paradigmatic scenario to probe the degree of cooperation and altruism in human subjects. It has been shown that if individuals are empathic, i.e., they play the game having in mind how their opponent will react by offering an amount that they themselves would accept, then non-rational large offers well above the smallest possible ones are evolutionarily selected. We here show that empathy itself may be selected and need not be exogenously imposed provided that interactions take place only with a fraction of the total population, and that the role of proposer or responder is randomly changed from round to round. These empathic agents, that displace agents with independent (uncorrelated) offers and proposals, behave far from what is expected rationally, offering and accepting sizable fractions of the amount to be shared. Specific values for the typical offer depend on the details of the interacion network and on the existence of hubs, but they are almost always significantly larger than zero, indicating that the mechanism at work here is quite general and could explain the emergence of empathy in very many different contexts.
format	article
author	Jaime Iranzo Luis M Floría Yamir Moreno Angel Sánchez
author_facet	Jaime Iranzo Luis M Floría Yamir Moreno Angel Sánchez
author_sort	Jaime Iranzo
title	Empathy emerges spontaneously in the ultimatum game: small groups and networks.
title_short	Empathy emerges spontaneously in the ultimatum game: small groups and networks.
title_full	Empathy emerges spontaneously in the ultimatum game: small groups and networks.
title_fullStr	Empathy emerges spontaneously in the ultimatum game: small groups and networks.
title_full_unstemmed	Empathy emerges spontaneously in the ultimatum game: small groups and networks.
title_sort	empathy emerges spontaneously in the ultimatum game: small groups and networks.
publisher	Public Library of Science (PLoS)
publishDate	2012
url	https://doaj.org/article/c6705652522a43a3b42647001c618cb3
work_keys_str_mv	AT jaimeiranzo empathyemergesspontaneouslyintheultimatumgamesmallgroupsandnetworks AT luismfloria empathyemergesspontaneouslyintheultimatumgamesmallgroupsandnetworks AT yamirmoreno empathyemergesspontaneouslyintheultimatumgamesmallgroupsandnetworks AT angelsanchez empathyemergesspontaneouslyintheultimatumgamesmallgroupsandnetworks
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Empathy emerges spontaneously in the ultimatum game: small groups and networks.

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