Different reactions to adverse neighborhoods in games of cooperation.

In social dilemmas, cooperation among randomly interacting individuals is often difficult to achieve. The situation changes if interactions take place in a network where the network structure jointly evolves with the behavioral strategies of the interacting individuals. In particular, cooperation ca...

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Autores principales:	Chunyan Zhang, Jianlei Zhang, Franz J Weissing, Matjaž Perc, Guangming Xie, Long Wang
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2012
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/c6fd2dde7c57427d87287d557cdfa9cc
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:c6fd2dde7c57427d87287d557cdfa9cc2021-11-18T07:21:18ZDifferent reactions to adverse neighborhoods in games of cooperation.1932-620310.1371/journal.pone.0035183https://doaj.org/article/c6fd2dde7c57427d87287d557cdfa9cc2012-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/pmid/22539958/pdf/?tool=EBIhttps://doaj.org/toc/1932-6203In social dilemmas, cooperation among randomly interacting individuals is often difficult to achieve. The situation changes if interactions take place in a network where the network structure jointly evolves with the behavioral strategies of the interacting individuals. In particular, cooperation can be stabilized if individuals tend to cut interaction links when facing adverse neighborhoods. Here we consider two different types of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, and all possible mixtures between these reactions. When faced with a gloomy outlook, players can either choose to cut and rewire some of their links to other individuals, or they can migrate to another location and establish new links in the new local neighborhood. We find that in general local rewiring is more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than emigration from adverse neighborhoods. Rewiring helps to maintain the diversity in the degree distribution of players and favors the spontaneous emergence of cooperative clusters. Both properties are known to favor the evolution of cooperation on networks. Interestingly, a mixture of migration and rewiring is even more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than rewiring on its own. While most models only consider a single type of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, the coexistence of several such reactions may actually be an optimal setting for the evolution of cooperation.Chunyan ZhangJianlei ZhangFranz J WeissingMatjaž PercGuangming XieLong WangPublic Library of Science (PLoS)articleMedicineRScienceQENPLoS ONE, Vol 7, Iss 4, p e35183 (2012)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Chunyan Zhang Jianlei Zhang Franz J Weissing Matjaž Perc Guangming Xie Long Wang Different reactions to adverse neighborhoods in games of cooperation.
description	In social dilemmas, cooperation among randomly interacting individuals is often difficult to achieve. The situation changes if interactions take place in a network where the network structure jointly evolves with the behavioral strategies of the interacting individuals. In particular, cooperation can be stabilized if individuals tend to cut interaction links when facing adverse neighborhoods. Here we consider two different types of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, and all possible mixtures between these reactions. When faced with a gloomy outlook, players can either choose to cut and rewire some of their links to other individuals, or they can migrate to another location and establish new links in the new local neighborhood. We find that in general local rewiring is more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than emigration from adverse neighborhoods. Rewiring helps to maintain the diversity in the degree distribution of players and favors the spontaneous emergence of cooperative clusters. Both properties are known to favor the evolution of cooperation on networks. Interestingly, a mixture of migration and rewiring is even more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than rewiring on its own. While most models only consider a single type of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, the coexistence of several such reactions may actually be an optimal setting for the evolution of cooperation.
format	article
author	Chunyan Zhang Jianlei Zhang Franz J Weissing Matjaž Perc Guangming Xie Long Wang
author_facet	Chunyan Zhang Jianlei Zhang Franz J Weissing Matjaž Perc Guangming Xie Long Wang
author_sort	Chunyan Zhang
title	Different reactions to adverse neighborhoods in games of cooperation.
title_short	Different reactions to adverse neighborhoods in games of cooperation.
title_full	Different reactions to adverse neighborhoods in games of cooperation.
title_fullStr	Different reactions to adverse neighborhoods in games of cooperation.
title_full_unstemmed	Different reactions to adverse neighborhoods in games of cooperation.
title_sort	different reactions to adverse neighborhoods in games of cooperation.
publisher	Public Library of Science (PLoS)
publishDate	2012
url	https://doaj.org/article/c6fd2dde7c57427d87287d557cdfa9cc
work_keys_str_mv	AT chunyanzhang differentreactionstoadverseneighborhoodsingamesofcooperation AT jianleizhang differentreactionstoadverseneighborhoodsingamesofcooperation AT franzjweissing differentreactionstoadverseneighborhoodsingamesofcooperation AT matjazperc differentreactionstoadverseneighborhoodsingamesofcooperation AT guangmingxie differentreactionstoadverseneighborhoodsingamesofcooperation AT longwang differentreactionstoadverseneighborhoodsingamesofcooperation
_version_	1718423625409757184

Different reactions to adverse neighborhoods in games of cooperation.

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