Different reactions to adverse neighborhoods in games of cooperation.
In social dilemmas, cooperation among randomly interacting individuals is often difficult to achieve. The situation changes if interactions take place in a network where the network structure jointly evolves with the behavioral strategies of the interacting individuals. In particular, cooperation ca...
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Autores principales: | Chunyan Zhang, Jianlei Zhang, Franz J Weissing, Matjaž Perc, Guangming Xie, Long Wang |
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Formato: | article |
Lenguaje: | EN |
Publicado: |
Public Library of Science (PLoS)
2012
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/c6fd2dde7c57427d87287d557cdfa9cc |
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