The Neosentimentalist Argument Against Moral Rationalism: Some Critical Observations

On the basis of the empirical evidence concerning the role of emotions in moral judgments, new sentimentalist approaches to metaethics have been proposed. Nichols’ theory of sentimental rules, in particular, associates the emphasis on emotive reactions to the relevance of a normative body of rules...

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Autor principal:	Massimo Reichlin
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
Materias:	moral sentimentalism moral rationalism moral internalism moral objectivism Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/c93eeb5d80714bb19ec556a7972d1a90
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:c93eeb5d80714bb19ec556a7972d1a902021-12-02T10:07:08ZThe Neosentimentalist Argument Against Moral Rationalism: Some Critical Observations10.13128/Phe_Mi-196152280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/c93eeb5d80714bb19ec556a7972d1a902016-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7097https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 On the basis of the empirical evidence concerning the role of emotions in moral judgments, new sentimentalist approaches to metaethics have been proposed. Nichols’ theory of sentimental rules, in particular, associates the emphasis on emotive reactions to the relevance of a normative body of rules that guide our judgment on actions. According to Nichols, the emotive mechanism of concern explains the acquisition of the moral capacity and, together with the evidence on psychopaths and autistic children, shows the implausibility of a) moral rationalism, both as a conceptual and as an empirical thesis; b) motivational internalism; and c) moral objectivism. However, if we distinguish between i) the initial acquisition of morality in children and ii) the adult experience of it, we can see that to accept a central role of the emotive mechanisms in the first is not to have shown their centrality in the second. In particular, it is not possible to account for the normative theory in purely emotive terms, even though we accept that their emotive connotation favours the evolutive success of the norms. A moderate rationalist view, grounded on the notion of reflective endorsement and on the cooperation between emotions and rational capacities seems quite compatible with the empirical evidence and can justify plausible forms of internalism and objectivism. Massimo ReichlinRosenberg & Sellierarticlemoral sentimentalismmoral rationalismmoral internalismmoral objectivismAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 3 (2016)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	moral sentimentalism moral rationalism moral internalism moral objectivism Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	moral sentimentalism moral rationalism moral internalism moral objectivism Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Massimo Reichlin The Neosentimentalist Argument Against Moral Rationalism: Some Critical Observations
description	On the basis of the empirical evidence concerning the role of emotions in moral judgments, new sentimentalist approaches to metaethics have been proposed. Nichols’ theory of sentimental rules, in particular, associates the emphasis on emotive reactions to the relevance of a normative body of rules that guide our judgment on actions. According to Nichols, the emotive mechanism of concern explains the acquisition of the moral capacity and, together with the evidence on psychopaths and autistic children, shows the implausibility of a) moral rationalism, both as a conceptual and as an empirical thesis; b) motivational internalism; and c) moral objectivism. However, if we distinguish between i) the initial acquisition of morality in children and ii) the adult experience of it, we can see that to accept a central role of the emotive mechanisms in the first is not to have shown their centrality in the second. In particular, it is not possible to account for the normative theory in purely emotive terms, even though we accept that their emotive connotation favours the evolutive success of the norms. A moderate rationalist view, grounded on the notion of reflective endorsement and on the cooperation between emotions and rational capacities seems quite compatible with the empirical evidence and can justify plausible forms of internalism and objectivism.
format	article
author	Massimo Reichlin
author_facet	Massimo Reichlin
author_sort	Massimo Reichlin
title	The Neosentimentalist Argument Against Moral Rationalism: Some Critical Observations
title_short	The Neosentimentalist Argument Against Moral Rationalism: Some Critical Observations
title_full	The Neosentimentalist Argument Against Moral Rationalism: Some Critical Observations
title_fullStr	The Neosentimentalist Argument Against Moral Rationalism: Some Critical Observations
title_full_unstemmed	The Neosentimentalist Argument Against Moral Rationalism: Some Critical Observations
title_sort	neosentimentalist argument against moral rationalism: some critical observations
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2016
url	https://doaj.org/article/c93eeb5d80714bb19ec556a7972d1a90
work_keys_str_mv	AT massimoreichlin theneosentimentalistargumentagainstmoralrationalismsomecriticalobservations AT massimoreichlin neosentimentalistargumentagainstmoralrationalismsomecriticalobservations
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The Neosentimentalist Argument Against Moral Rationalism: Some Critical Observations

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