Chomsky on Analytic and Necessary Propositions

My aim is to critically discuss Chomsky’s position concerning the analytic-synthetic distinction and necessary propositions. To do so, I present Chomsky’s objection to Quine’s criticism of the analytic-synthetic distinction, and I point out that Chomsky’s defense of such a distinction can be effica...

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Autor principal: Enrico Cipriani
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Publicado: Rosenberg & Sellier 2017
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:c944977fbe19413f9af0e71bfe1db82b2021-12-02T10:15:20ZChomsky on Analytic and Necessary Propositions10.13128/Phe_Mi-211112280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/c944977fbe19413f9af0e71bfe1db82b2017-08-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7271https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 My aim is to critically discuss Chomsky’s position concerning the analytic-synthetic distinction and necessary propositions. To do so, I present Chomsky’s objection to Quine’s criticism of the analytic-synthetic distinction, and I point out that Chomsky’s defense of such a distinction can be efficacious only under the assumption of conceptual innateness. I then focus on Chomsky’s analysis of necessary propositions. In particular, I present Chomsky’s objection to Kripke’s essentialism, and Chomsky’s hypothesis that the distinction between necessary and contingent truths is determined by the structure of the conceptual system and its relations with other systems of common-sense understanding. I highlight that this hypothesis is not compatible with Chomsky’s own objection to Kripke. Enrico CiprianiRosenberg & SellierarticleAnalytic-Synthetic distinction“humbler” notion of analyticityInnateness Hypothesisessential propertiesconceivability and possibilityAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 12 (2017)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
FR
IT
topic Analytic-Synthetic distinction
“humbler” notion of analyticity
Innateness Hypothesis
essential properties
conceivability and possibility
Aesthetics
BH1-301
Ethics
BJ1-1725
spellingShingle Analytic-Synthetic distinction
“humbler” notion of analyticity
Innateness Hypothesis
essential properties
conceivability and possibility
Aesthetics
BH1-301
Ethics
BJ1-1725
Enrico Cipriani
Chomsky on Analytic and Necessary Propositions
description My aim is to critically discuss Chomsky’s position concerning the analytic-synthetic distinction and necessary propositions. To do so, I present Chomsky’s objection to Quine’s criticism of the analytic-synthetic distinction, and I point out that Chomsky’s defense of such a distinction can be efficacious only under the assumption of conceptual innateness. I then focus on Chomsky’s analysis of necessary propositions. In particular, I present Chomsky’s objection to Kripke’s essentialism, and Chomsky’s hypothesis that the distinction between necessary and contingent truths is determined by the structure of the conceptual system and its relations with other systems of common-sense understanding. I highlight that this hypothesis is not compatible with Chomsky’s own objection to Kripke.
format article
author Enrico Cipriani
author_facet Enrico Cipriani
author_sort Enrico Cipriani
title Chomsky on Analytic and Necessary Propositions
title_short Chomsky on Analytic and Necessary Propositions
title_full Chomsky on Analytic and Necessary Propositions
title_fullStr Chomsky on Analytic and Necessary Propositions
title_full_unstemmed Chomsky on Analytic and Necessary Propositions
title_sort chomsky on analytic and necessary propositions
publisher Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate 2017
url https://doaj.org/article/c944977fbe19413f9af0e71bfe1db82b
work_keys_str_mv AT enricocipriani chomskyonanalyticandnecessarypropositions
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