Chomsky on Analytic and Necessary Propositions
My aim is to critically discuss Chomsky’s position concerning the analytic-synthetic distinction and necessary propositions. To do so, I present Chomsky’s objection to Quine’s criticism of the analytic-synthetic distinction, and I point out that Chomsky’s defense of such a distinction can be effica...
Guardado en:
Autor principal: | Enrico Cipriani |
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Formato: | article |
Lenguaje: | EN FR IT |
Publicado: |
Rosenberg & Sellier
2017
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/c944977fbe19413f9af0e71bfe1db82b |
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