Indirect reciprocity under incomplete observation.

Indirect reciprocity, in which individuals help others with a good reputation but not those with a bad reputation, is a mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situations when individuals do not repeatedly interact with the same partners. In a relatively large society where indirect reciprocity...

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Autores principales: Mitsuhiro Nakamura, Naoki Masuda
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Lenguaje:EN
Publicado: Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2011
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/ca4c1a51b33149b1b69e2bb3942142f6
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:ca4c1a51b33149b1b69e2bb3942142f62021-11-18T05:50:23ZIndirect reciprocity under incomplete observation.1553-734X1553-735810.1371/journal.pcbi.1002113https://doaj.org/article/ca4c1a51b33149b1b69e2bb3942142f62011-07-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/pmid/21829335/?tool=EBIhttps://doaj.org/toc/1553-734Xhttps://doaj.org/toc/1553-7358Indirect reciprocity, in which individuals help others with a good reputation but not those with a bad reputation, is a mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situations when individuals do not repeatedly interact with the same partners. In a relatively large society where indirect reciprocity is relevant, individuals may not know each other's reputation even indirectly. Previous studies investigated the situations where individuals playing the game have to determine the action possibly without knowing others' reputations. Nevertheless, the possibility that observers of the game, who generate the reputation of the interacting players, assign reputations without complete information about them has been neglected. Because an individual acts as an interacting player and as an observer on different occasions if indirect reciprocity is endogenously sustained in a society, the incompleteness of information may affect either role. We examine the game of indirect reciprocity when the reputations of players are not necessarily known to observers and to interacting players. We find that the trustful discriminator, which cooperates with good and unknown players and defects against bad players, realizes cooperative societies under seven social norms. Among the seven social norms, three of the four suspicious norms under which cooperation (defection) to unknown players leads to a good (bad) reputation enable cooperation down to a relatively small observation probability. In contrast, the three trustful norms under which both cooperation and defection to unknown players lead to a good reputation are relatively efficient.Mitsuhiro NakamuraNaoki MasudaPublic Library of Science (PLoS)articleBiology (General)QH301-705.5ENPLoS Computational Biology, Vol 7, Iss 7, p e1002113 (2011)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
topic Biology (General)
QH301-705.5
spellingShingle Biology (General)
QH301-705.5
Mitsuhiro Nakamura
Naoki Masuda
Indirect reciprocity under incomplete observation.
description Indirect reciprocity, in which individuals help others with a good reputation but not those with a bad reputation, is a mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situations when individuals do not repeatedly interact with the same partners. In a relatively large society where indirect reciprocity is relevant, individuals may not know each other's reputation even indirectly. Previous studies investigated the situations where individuals playing the game have to determine the action possibly without knowing others' reputations. Nevertheless, the possibility that observers of the game, who generate the reputation of the interacting players, assign reputations without complete information about them has been neglected. Because an individual acts as an interacting player and as an observer on different occasions if indirect reciprocity is endogenously sustained in a society, the incompleteness of information may affect either role. We examine the game of indirect reciprocity when the reputations of players are not necessarily known to observers and to interacting players. We find that the trustful discriminator, which cooperates with good and unknown players and defects against bad players, realizes cooperative societies under seven social norms. Among the seven social norms, three of the four suspicious norms under which cooperation (defection) to unknown players leads to a good (bad) reputation enable cooperation down to a relatively small observation probability. In contrast, the three trustful norms under which both cooperation and defection to unknown players lead to a good reputation are relatively efficient.
format article
author Mitsuhiro Nakamura
Naoki Masuda
author_facet Mitsuhiro Nakamura
Naoki Masuda
author_sort Mitsuhiro Nakamura
title Indirect reciprocity under incomplete observation.
title_short Indirect reciprocity under incomplete observation.
title_full Indirect reciprocity under incomplete observation.
title_fullStr Indirect reciprocity under incomplete observation.
title_full_unstemmed Indirect reciprocity under incomplete observation.
title_sort indirect reciprocity under incomplete observation.
publisher Public Library of Science (PLoS)
publishDate 2011
url https://doaj.org/article/ca4c1a51b33149b1b69e2bb3942142f6
work_keys_str_mv AT mitsuhironakamura indirectreciprocityunderincompleteobservation
AT naokimasuda indirectreciprocityunderincompleteobservation
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