Learning in a Hiring Logic and Optimal Contracts
This paper examines a hiring logic problem in which all players involved in this game are exposed to scenarios where they can learn from the changes and these modifications influence their preferences; consequently, their decision-making differs from the classical agency theory proposed by <xref...
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | EN |
| Publicado: |
IEEE
2021
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/cfbc1d78b3794e97b3b6fd6c960c7a8d |
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